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Abstract
This Ph.D dissertation develops general equilibrium issues of overlapping generations
economies (OLG hereafter), which play important roles to study many intertemporal
phenomena. They are particularly adapted to study issues on distributions between
different generations, pensions systems, debts, taxes, money, monetary policy, interest
rates and growth. We use a general equilibrium approach and study classical issues such
as the existence of equilibrium, characterization of Pareto optimal allocations.
Many works on OLG have some limitations regarding the production sector. Indeed,
standard hypothesis supposes that production set is convex, returns to scale are either
constant or decreasing. But many sectors involve high technological revolution which
implies internal or external economies of scale, highlighting the importance of increasing
returns in growth. The first step of our work is thus to consider, a standard OLG model
with production beyond the classical hypothesis of constant returns to scale. We are
concerned, in the first place by a formalization of increasing returns in OLG models,
described in Balasko, Cass and Shell [3], Balasko and Shell [4], [5]. The production
possibilities are described by a sequence of production mapping and the main innovation
comes from the fact that we allow for increasing returns to scale of more general type of
non-convexities. To describe the behavior of the firms, we consider loss-free pricing rules,
which cover the case of the average pricing rule, the competitive behavior when the firms
have convex production sets, and the competitive behavior with quantity constraints.
We prove the existence of an equilibrium under assumptions, which are at the same level
of generality than the ones for the existence in an exchange economy.
Beyond the existence result, we are led to study the mechanism of transfer between
generations in order to analyze the possible perpetuation of firms. We then incorporate
durable goods which may be stored from one period to a successive period through a
linear technology. In this model, we establish not only the existence of an equilibrium but
also highlight features of durable goods that entitle consumers, the roles of producers,
lenders and borrowers, even at the end of their lifetime. Another important result
on the relation between prices allows us to make a link with the Pareto efficiency of
equilibrium, confirming their role in restoring the market failure in OLG economies. We
review the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations, in the line of Balasko and Shell
[4], but in addition we allow for multiple agents and multiple goods per period. Our
approach is set-theoretic and geometrical. The consumers characteristics are described
by their consumption sets, their preference sets and the associated normal cones. We
give conditions of Pareto optimality, under very basic assumptions, by providing a simple
and geometric version of the proof of Balasko and Shell [4], encompassing the case of
non-complete and non-transitive preferences.
Re´sume´
Cette the`se s’inscrit dans l’e´tude des mode`les a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es qui a aujourd’hui
un roˆle central pour e´tudier de nombreux sujets en e´conomie. Les mode`les ge´ne´rations
font l’objet de travaux tant en microe´conomie qu’en macroe´conomie a` coˆte´ des mode`les
de croissance optimale. Une des limitations des nombreux travaux sur les mode`les
ge´ne´rations provient de la mode´lisation du secteur productif, a` savoir les hypothe`ses
standards de convexite´, les rendements d’e´chelle constants ou de´croissants. Mais cer-
taines productions sont concerne´es par des la re´volutions technologiques impliquant des
e´conomies d’e´chelle interne et externe. De plus, si on conside`re les mode`les de croissance
endoge`ne, on assiste a` des externalite´s concernant le capital humain, qui sont des sources
de rendement croissant au niveau agre´ge´. Ainsi, les rendements croissants sont essentiels
en e´conomie.
Nous commenc¸ons alors par conside´rer, dans le Chapitre 2, un mode`le a` ge´ne´ra- tions
imbrique´es avec production, mais au-dela` de l’hypothe`se classique de rendements con-
stants. Les capacite´s de production sont mode´lise´es par une suite de fonctions multi-
voques de production, de plus, nous ne faisons aucune hypothe`se sur les rendements
d’e´chelles, ainsi les rendements croissants sont permis. Les comportements des produc-
teurs sont de´crits par des re`gles de tarification sans perte, qui comprennent la tarification
au couˆt moyen, le comportement compe´titif lorsque les ensembles de production sont
convexes, ainsi que le comportement compe´titif sous contrainte a` la Dehez–Dre`ze [23],
[24]. Nous e´tablissons l’existence d’e´quilibre sous des hypothe`ses aussi ge´ne´rales que
celles des mode`les d’e´change pure.
Dans le Chapitre 3, nous proposons d’e´tudier la possibilte´ de transfert entre les ge´ne´ra-
tions. Pour cela`, nous introduisons des biens durables qui peuvent eˆtre stocke´s entre
deux pe´riodes successives, graˆce a` une technologie line´aire. Nous de´montrons l’existence
d’e´quilibre via une c´onomie e´quivalente sans bien durable, dans laquelle la pe´riode de
vie de chaque consommateur est e´tendue sur trois pe´riodes. Un re´sultat additionnel
concernant la relation entre les prix nous permettrait de faire le lien avec les conditions
d’optimalite´.
Le Chapitre 4 reprend les conditions d’optimalite´ vues dans Balasko et Shell [4], mais
en plus nous conside´rons le cas ou` il y a plusieurs agents par pe´riode. Notre approche
est ensembliste et ge´ome´trique. Chaque consommateur est caracte´rise´ par son ensem-
ble de consommation, ainsi que son ensemble d’allocations pre´fe´re´es et le coˆne normal
correspondant. Nous caracte´risons les allocations Pareto optimales en donnant une ap-
proche simple et ge´ome´trique a` la preuve de Balasko et Shell [4], tenant aussi compte
des pre´fe´rences non-comple`tes et non-transitives.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 OLG models of general equilibrium
Overlapping generations models (OLG hereafter) were introduced by Allais [1] in 1947
and Samuelson [54] in 1958. Observing that “we live in a world where new generations
are always coming along”, Samuelson built a model in which generations overlap indefi-
nitely, in contrast to the Arrow-Debreu model which assumes all agents as contemporary.
OLG models evolve infinitely many dates, and at each date, a “generation” of new agents
is born and agents live within two subsequent dates. Thus, at date t, consumers with
different lifetimes coexist: the young consumers born at date t and the old ones born at
the preceeding date t− 1. In addition, at each date, there are finitely many goods. One
important feature of the Samuelson’s OLG model is this double infinity of goods and
consumers, which is source of many unobserved phenomena in Arrow-Debreu economies:
money has a value and the first welfare theorem may fail. Indeed, in an economy where
there are many dates, consumers may wish to transfer their wealth accross different
periods of their lifetime, by means of contracts for future deliveries, debts or money.
In a finite horizon case, by backward induction, it is impossible to hold money with a
positive value since at the last period it is worthless, so it is at one period before the
last one and so on. But in an OLG economy, there is no last date, money can have a
positive value even though it does not enter as an argument in the preferences of con-
sumers, and competitive equilibria need not be Pareto efficient. Indeed, by taking into
account even the simple demographic structure of OLG models, the wealth of agents at
equilibrium prices can be finite although the total endowments have infinite value. OLG
models highlight the possibility of inefficiency, which is excluded in the Arrow-Debreu
model, and which can be recovered by transfers between generations. OLG models are
then more specific and more realistic than the standard and static Arrow-Debreu model.
1
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They are particularly approppriate to study redistribution or reallocation issues between
different generations (pension system, debt, taxes etc), intertemporal phenomena such
as monetary policy and growth, besides optimal growth theory.
Samuelson’s OLG model has been since developped into a more comprehensive model
called also “OLG model of general equilibrium”as pointed by Geanakoplos in [34]. An
OLG model can thus be described as a general equilibrium model with infinitely many
agents and goods, and a production sector. The idea is to use a mechanism analysis
which aims at finding the “good” allocation for all economic agents, that is, an allocation
which satisfies, in term of utility the current generations but which does not penalize the
future generations. Our work lies in this respect and treats general equilibrium issues
such as equilibrium existence, optimality, but in addition we enlarge the framework by
relaxing some classical restrictions and allowing for more general but simpler results.
In this line, we go beyond the limiting assumption of constant returns to scale and
consider the possibility of increasing returns to scale in the production side. In order
to study transfer mechanisms accross generations, we allow for goods to be durable,
they can be consumed but can also play other roles such as input factors (in a storage
technology) or collaterals for loans. Thus any agent who holds a durable good acts
as consumer and producer at the same time, and sees his lifetime artificially extended
given the remaining wealth that may still persist after they disappear from the economy.
Their role in restoring inefficiency in OLG models leads us to consider Pareto optimality
characterizations. For this matter, we propose to revisit the characterizations provided
by Balasko and Shell [4], as a note where the setting considers non-transitive and non-
complete preferencesand the approach is mainly set-theoretic.
In the section that follows, we highlight the relevence of increasing returns to scale in
economics, their driving sources, and what has been documented in literature.
1.2 Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS)
1.2.1 On the sources of increasing returns to scale
Increasing returns to scale occur when the firm adds more to output than to costs,
that is there is an increase in output as cost decreases. Thus IRS have their sources
in economies of scale, internal or external to the firm, resulting in an increase of the
average productivity of the firm.
Internal economies come from the expansion of the firm itself, that is its average costs
depend on its size. There are many ways to achieve internal economies of scale. They
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can occur due to technical economies, which can be related to a large machinery and
equipments resulting in a production of large scale so that the average cost declines.
In addition, large firms have the possibility to increase productivity by using a labour
division, splitting tasks according to the specialization of the workforce. Another form of
labour division is the managerial economies of scale, showing the importance of trained
and qualified employees who are able to take quicker and better decisions. Good man-
agers are able to find new methods and equipments, more profitable to the firm, cutting
wastes and allowing for more efficiency in terms of time thus reducing production costs.
Bigger firms have more possibilities to enjoy financial economies of scale since they are
more favorable to loans at lower rates than the smaller ones, leading to additionnal
resources and opportunities to raise their scale. Another source of internal economies is
the monopsy power, which occurs when a firm has access to its factor inputs at lower
prices in the market. This is the case of some large firms who are able to negotiate lower
prices when purchasing raw materials in some poor countries.
External economies of scale occur outside of the firm, in this case its average costs do
not depend on its size, however they can be internal to the industry to which it belongs.
This corresponds to Alfred Marshall’s1 treatment of increasing returns: external to the
firm but internal to the industry. An important source of external economies of scale
is knowledge spillover that benefits industrial clusters. Indeed workers from different
firms can easily interact, share ideas and knowledge, allowing firms to take advantage
of improvements of human capital, inventions and technical successes of other firms.
These informal channels and knowledge diffusions are not costly but crucial for success.
These interactions are beneficial especially for large industries. It is evident that external
economies can also be brought by scientific progresses of local universities, or by creations
of transportations and infrastructures that firms gathered in the surrounding area can
benefit.
These two types of economies of scale have different implications in the market. An
industry concerned with external economies, for instance can consist of small firms
under perfect competition. Indeed, it is possible that given productions of all other
firms, a single firm j’s production set is a convex cone. Thus increasing returns due
to external economies can be compatible, at least partially to the standard competitive
model. However, internal economies result in cost advantage of large firms over small
ones, leading to deviations from perfect competition and to alternative modelling of
firms behaviour. This explains the introduction of pricing rules in literature, and we
shall see that, under a nonnegativity condition, this notion also allows to give account
of models with increasing returns in macroeconomics, where they are usually associated
to imperfect competition.
1See Marshall [45] (1920)
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Before introducing the notion of pricing rules, let us recall an example provided by Laf-
font (1979) [39] and used by Bonnisseau (1994) [9] to illustrate that due to externalities,
increasing returns are internalized so that at the aggregate level, the production set fails
to be convex. More specifically, the iso-output set is non-convex, leading to an optimal
production that neither maximizes the profit nor minimizes the cost. The example is as
follows:
Consider three goods A, B, C, where C is used as a factor input and A and B are
consumption goods produced by two firms. The first firm produces at constant returns
to scale, and its production set is given by:
Y1 := {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | b ≤ 0, c ≤ 0, a ≤ −c}
The second firm incurs negative externalities from the first firm. Given a production
plan (a, b, c) its production set is:
Y2(a, b, c) := {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a ≤ 0, c ≤ 0, b ≤ −c(1 + min{1
2
,− c1
a1
− 1})}
There is a unique consumer, endowed initially with ω = (0, 0, 1), and whose utility
function is defined by: u : (xA, xB, xC) ∈ R3+ → xA(xB)3. Although the productions
sets are convex, the aggregate production set, given by
Y := {y ∈ R3 | ∃y1 ∈ Y1, ∃y2 ∈ Y2(y1), y = y1 + y2}
is not convex. Indeed, for a total input factor equals to 1, the intersection between
Y and the plane given by c = 1 fails to be convex, as shown in Figure 1.1. Thus Y
is not convex, which implies that the graph of Y2 is not convex. There is a unique
Pareto optimum, given by: x∗ = (16 ,
9
8 , 0), y
∗
1 = (
1
6 , 0,−14), y∗2 = (0, 98 ,−34), where both
firms operate. Note that the production plan y∗1 is not efficient, since firm 1 can still
srictly increase his production in good A at the same input level and the minimization
of cost would be reached if only firm 1 operated. Moreover, the aggregate production
y∗ = y∗1 +y∗2 does not correspond to the maximization of profit at any given price. Thus,
when externalities are internalized, increasing returns occur so that the production is
not convex anymore, and the profit maximization or cost minimization at given price
become meaningless.
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Figure 1.1: An example of non-convex production due to externalities ([9], [39])
1.2.2 The concept of Pricing Rules
Increasing returns to scale are sources of non-convexities in production, which makes
the profit maximizing behaviour at given prices meaningless. In this line, it is necessary
to model the behavior of producers beyond the profit maximizing one.
A pricing rule maps a firm’s set of weakly efficient production plans to the set of prices.
This concept allows for a more general type of behavior of firms.
Formally, let us consider a finite set of producers J . Let Y j be the production set of firm
j and let F j denote set of weakly efficient production plans, F j := {yj ∈ Y j | y′j /∈ Y j}.
A pricing rule is a mapping ϕj which associates to a feasible and weakly efficient pro-
duction plan yj ∈ F j , a set of prices ϕj(yj) compatible with this production. The graph
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of ϕj describes combinations of prices and production plan that firm j finds “accept-
able”. This concept allows for different behaviors thus different pricing rules for different
firms. When a combination of prices and production plans (p, y) is found acceptable to
all of the firms find , it is called a production equilibrium. Such an equilibrium may
not be reached if pricing rules fail to be continuous or sensitive. Thus, although it is
a general and flexible concept, a pricing rule cannot be completely arbitrary, and some
regularity restrictions are needed on the admissible pricing rules. We will then focus on
non-empty-, compact- and convex- valued mappings, which graphs are closed. These
properties ensure the closedness and connectedness of the graph of the pricing rules.
Particular cases are:
• the profit maximization at given prices, in the case of convex production, or ex-
ternal economies of scale,
• the average cost pricing: when firms choose prices which make them just break-
even,
• the marginal pricing rule: firms are instructed to sell their outputs at prices that
satisfy the first order condition for optimality (in this case, losses may occur under
increasing returns to scale),
• the constrained maximization profit: firms maximize profits at given prices, but
subject to quantity constraints.
When firms exhibit non-convexities, then losses are possible. It is then natural to require
firms to have boundaries on their losses, in order to ensure that a production equilibrium
exists. This property ensures sensitivity of the pricing rules to changes in the production
plan yj , and non-emptiness of the set of production equilibria. A pricing rule has the
bounded losses property when there exists a scalar αj ≤ 0 such that for each yj ∈ F j ,
q · yj ≥ αj , for all q ∈ ϕj(yj). When pricing rules are regular with bounded losses,
the set of admissible prices given a production plan cannot reduce to a singleton, this
is a favorable condition to the existence of production equilibrium. A general existence
result when firms follow bounded losses pricing rules is established by Bonnisseau and
Cornet in [10].
Pricing rules can be endogeneous or exogeneous to the models, they allow for both
price-taking and price setting behaviours. In [26], Dierker, Guesnerie and Neuefeind
established the existence of equilibrium when some firms are price takers and other
firms are price setters: they set the prices of their products given the prices of the
inputs. Their result encompasses a wide array of pricing rules, including the marginal
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cost pricing rule. Their result also takes into account the losses incured by firms, financed
through exogeneously given shares.
1.2.3 Some existing results on IRS
There is a wide range of literature in microeconomics and macroeconomics, taking into
account increasing returns to scale. Most of such works are centered on endogenous
growth.
On one side, many results and analysis on the existence of equilibrium when the behav-
iors of firms are described in terms of pricing rules have been established in literature,
see Cornet [22] (1988), Dehez and Dre`ze [23], [24], Heal [38], and Villar [59] (2000), with
the latter work covering very comprehensive results on convex and non-convex produc-
tion economies. More recent results also can be found in Bonnisseau and Jamin [11],
[12] (2008, 2009), where [12] treats increasing returns in intertemporal economies, which
is then directly applicable to OLG models, when extended to the infinite period case.
Brown and Heal [18] (1979) has reached a result standing for the possibility of increasing
returns to be an essential ingredient to attempt an economic development, when they
treat equity and efficiency in a Walrasian framework with production and increasing
returns. In [18], the owner of a firm that my incur losses has no interest to close it
down. It is indeed concluded that “with increasing returns to scale in production, it may
be possible to remove some endowment from one person, give it to another, and make
both better off”. Translating this result to development economics supposes that in an
under-developed country with a highly unequal distribution of income, a redistribution
away from the very rich may in the long run make all better off, because the acquisition
of purchasing power by the middle and lower income groups may lead to development
of a mass market and a substantial increase in industrial profits.
On the other side, many works and results have been developed on models of endoge-
neous growth based on increasing returns. Young [60] (1928) pointed out, in his analysis
increasing returns as source of economic progress, and in the 1980s appears a remark-
able revival of interest in economic growth. For instance, Romer [53] (1986) proposed
an alternative view on long-run growth driven by the accumulation of knowledge, which
has an increasing marginal product on the production of consumption good; thre, ex-
ternalities, increasing returns in the production of output, and decreasing returns in the
production of new knowledge are keys. In List and Zhou [40] (2007), increasing returns
to scale arising from fixed costs of production and internal to the firm generate posi-
tive growth. Moreover, Lucas [41] (2002), Barro and Sala-i Martin [6] (2003) provide a
thoughtful literature synthesis on economic growth.
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Now, we consider some models of neoclassical growth with increasing returns introduced
by Benhabib and Farmer [7] (1994), Gali [33] (1995), and Barseghyan and DiCecio [8]
(2006). [12] focuses on indeterminacy caused by increasing returns, while [33] and [8]
conclude on multiple steady states equilibria leading to poverty traps, for some degree of
increasing returns to scale, a conclusion that is in opposition to the intuition proposed by
Brown and Heal [18]. The common feature of these studies centers on the modelling of
the production sector, where increasing returns are exclusively associated to imperfect
competitions. The structure of the market consists of considering two main sectors
of production: one for intermediate goods and the other one for final goods. Firms
in the sector of final goods operate under perfect competition while each intermediate
goods producer has a monopoly power over the good it produces 2. This formalization
allows then for the application of competitive behaviour approach on the production
sector despite the increasing returns to scale. This imperfect competition structure,
takes into account the market power that firms with increasing returns possess, allowing
them to make positive profit. If a main reason of incompatibility between competition
and increasing returns lies on the supply mappings that may fail to be well defined,
this market structure allows to write a closed form making equilibrium possible in the
presence of incresing returns. This modelling is actually a variant of pricing rules that
generates no losses, but as concluded in Barseghyan and DiCecio [8], “bad equilibria”and
poverty trap may occur. We then wonder whether this structure is not neutral to this
result and if going beyond it by letting firms behave differently according more general
pricing policies would not result in good equilibria only, in favour of increasing returns
in development economics.
1.3 Approach and Overview of the results
Although the focus and the motivations are not necessarely the same, the results enu-
merated above bring further issues to be deeply considered. We are concerned, in the
first place by a formalization of increasing returns in OLG models, described in Balasko,
Cass and Shell [3], Balasko and Shell [4], [5]. This thesis consists of three mains chapters
which correspond to three main papers, on increasing returns to scale [13], on durable
goods [51] and on optimality characterizations [14].
2In [42] is provided the notion of Staggered pricing model: the idea is to embed intermediate goods
produced by firms with market power. Intermediate goods are bundled without cost (without labor or
capital) into a final good by a competitive firm. This brings their market power to intermediate goods
producers
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1.3.1 OLG models with increasing returns
We start with the OLG models, described in Balasko, Cass and Shell [3], Balasko and
Shell [4], [5], see also Tvede [57] for a more intuitive version of OLG models. Our work
relies on existing results on equilibrium studies in economies with increasing returns to
scale, which namely consist of modelizing the production sector in a more general way
using the concept of pricing rules.
Given the demographic structure of OLG economies, where at each date t = 1, 2, . . .
appears a new cohort of individuals living for two successive dates, we model production
capacities sequentially through set-valued mappings (F jt ) which associate, to a vector
of inputs at date t, a vector of outputs at date t + 1. This implicitely supposes that
production takes time, and an investment at a period one cannot give any return before
the subsequent period. Since the production is described in a recursive way, one can
think of a pricing rule, defined in a similar way. Thus at each period t, there is a set-
valued mapping ϕjt which associates to a weakly efficient production plan y
j
t of firm j
a set of admissible prices. This corresponds to the idea that production decisions are
taken at each period, and that compatible prices are also determined at each period.
A global pricing rule would correspond to a production and a price decides at the firt
period t = 1 and established for all the future periods. This approach is less suitable
with the structure of OLG models, where at each period, new consumers take part to
the economical decision and thus to the production decision related to their lifetime.
We do not make any assumption on the returns to scale, but we posit classical hypothesis
such as closedness, free-disposal and possibility of inaction. We consider firms to be
active forever once they are set, but this does not exclude the possibility of considering
productions starting at each date and active for two subsequent dates as in Tvede [57].
In this case, we have a sequence of set-valued mapping (F jt )t started at each date t,
active at dates t and t+1, and inactive at dates t′ 6= t, t+1, that is (F jt′)t′ are identically
null.
We suppose in addition that firms are privately owned and we will naturally make use
of the properties of regularity and of bounded losses in our model with production. In
particular, our approach consists of cases where firms admit only non-negative profits,
thus we will focus on loss-free pricing rules, that is the bound αj defined in section 1.2.2
is reduced to zero. This restriction is natural when firms are not regulated and when
0 ∈ Y jt , that is firms are privately owned and can always refuse to produce, instead
of incuring losses. These pricing rules may be considered when there are increasing
returns to scale, fixed costs, when there is a fixed capital that is indivisible input, or the
production function is S-shaped.
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Particular loss-free pricing rules are the constrained profit maximization, the average
cost pricing, or more generally the mark-up pricing, which consists of adding a profit
component to the average cost. More details on this class of pricing rules are provided
in Villar [59]. As already remarked earlier, increasing returns are usually associated
to imperfect competition, especially in macroeconomics, but the pricing that results
from such a market is actually a variant of loss-free pricing rule. For instance, the one
proposed by Benhabib and Farmer [7] is a mark-up pricing rule where the mark-up is
constant.
Given the private ownership and the free losses assumptions, profits possibly strictly
positive are redistributed among consumers according to their exogeneous shares on
firms. We then prove the existence of an equilibrium under assumptions, which are at
the same level of generality than the ones for the existence in an exchange economy. It
is important to remark that the free-disposal assumption is key in this existence result.
Indeed, as established in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) [10] 3, this assumption allows
the usual existence to hold when production sets are non-convex. This explains why we
introduce positive polar cones in our proof, which at least permits our global production
to satisfy a weak form of free disposal.
However, this result relies on an assumption of private ownership with given shares,
which is rather restrictive in an economy where firms are perpetuated by successive
generations, but whose transfers of firms ownerships are not formalized since no stock
markets are introduced. This issue,clearly ignored if firms exhibited constant returns to
scale with zero profits highlights the usefulness of considering a general wealth distribu-
tion function and a mechanism of wealth transfers between successive generations, which
will allow to keep the firms active forever. Letting newly born individuals be endowed
with exogeneously given shares can be explained through bequest motives, that is old
agents of previous generation, since they are about to die, freely leave to the young their
ownership. In this way, agents can prevent the disappearance of their firms from the
economy, and their offsprings who become the new owners of the firms will distribute the
profits between them according to the shares they have inherited, leave the ownerships
to the next cohort and so on. Another possibility, implicit to our model, is the existence
of hidden financial markets, where agents either save at risk-free rate or invest in firms
by buying shares, but either choice is supposed to bring them the same return, under
the absence of arbitrage condition and the equi-profitability among the firms.
Although our model also accounts for a succession of firms active only for two dates,
the possibility of perpetual firms drives us to consider durable goods, through which,
3See [10] Lemma 5.1
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transfer of wealth, and in particular of capital of firms could be meaningful accross
generations.
1.3.2 OLG models with durable goods
Throughout chapter 3, we will see that durable goods serve in transferring wealth accross
generations, either through markets or bequest motives, but in addition, they can also
provide to their owners, possibilities to have access to a loan backed up by collaterals,
to hold inputs for additionnal endowments that can be useful to the future, not only for
their well-being during their old age but also for the well-being of their offsprings.
We start considering a simple pure exchange economy with durable goods and will make
use of the intuition obtained in this framework to understand the transfer mechanism
between generations. Our model incorporates then durable goods which may be stored
from one period to a successive period through a linear technology. We show that the
existence of an equilibrium can be established by considering an equivalent economy
“without”durable goods, where the agents economic activity is extended over three suc-
cessive periods. This intermediate step helps to confirm that a consumption of durable
goods by young agents has an impact, both on their consumption when old, but also
after their lifetime, this explains the extension from a two-period lifetime into three-
period one. It is clear that the consumption behaviour has impacts not only on their
close future or their own generation but also on the succeeding generations.
However, above the existence result, this paper provides a mechanism within which
generations successively transfer their wealth, by means of durable goods, and shows that
their consumptions, thanks to their durability, entail their owners the role of producer:
they have in their possession a technology that allows them to store or transfer their
consumption to the next period. Durable good can be then assimilated to a saving,
an asset holding that permits young agents to shift their endowment to a preferred
consumption plan. In the same spirit, our model implicitely supposes the existence of a
financial markets, where agents take loans and back them up with their durable goods,
which will be systematically seized once they disappear from the economy. Basically,
our model entitles agents to buy and hold durable goods, seen as assets, even at their
old age; this situation can be explained by a lifetime contract called also viager, when
a house, a durable good, allows old agents to enjoy not only of that house but also of
an additionnal resource corresponding to the financial value of it on the future market.
Our model is not incompatible with uncertain lifetimes, where agents may hold assets
or be involved in any liability at the end of their lifetime. If indeed, at each period,
they have a probability to die in the next period, then defaults are prevented thanks
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to the durable goods that serve as collaterals to loans. In both certain and uncertain
frameworks, we remark that a purchase of durable goods by old can be motivated by
bequest motives, where agents are supposed to be altruistic.
While we mainly focus on the mechanism of wealth transfer between generations, it
is important to note that many works, theoretical and empirical, on durable goods
already exist in the literature, to study different issues, such as savings, borrowing
constraints and collaterals. Furtherore, since durable goods are used as component in
wealth, they are useful to study wealth distribution, see Diaz and Luenngo-Prado in
[25], who in addition relate the two with precautionary savings. Indeed, in [25], the
liquidity or illiquuidity nature of durable goods, have impact on the behaviour and
wealth composition of agents, reflected to the notion of precautionary saving, especially
when there is uncertainty or risk in the economy. Such an issue is not treated in our case,
especially since the main feature of the durable goods we consider is their desirability.
But this framework can be worth consideration for the continuation of this work, where
liquid assets can be represented by shares on firms that may be may make positive
profits. Moreover, these studies which involve empirical analysis consider durable goods
which are not easily divisible, and entail very high transaction costs, as in [46]. In [25],
they are assumed specific to households and cannot be traded or rented without first
converting them back to a productive capital. Our model does not have this specificity
and allows for a durable good to be divisible when sold on a future market to the young.
But in case of production, this work meets that property and goes in the line of our aim
to study the perpetuation of firms through transfers of shares and property rights accross
generations. For instance, agents partipate in firms by putting together their investment
so that each durable capital, possibly specific to each firm is kept in its entirety.
Another important result involves a relation between prices at equilibrium, which is
similar to the one provided by Balaso and Shell in [4]. Indeed, equilibria may fail to be
efficient in OLG models, and durable goods such as money, or an infinitely lived asset
like a land, could restore the market failure. We then propose to revisit the Pareto
optimality characterizations provided by Balaso and Shell.
1.3.3 Characterization of optimal allocations in OLG models with mul-
tiple goods
We propose to review in chapter 4 the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations,
in the line of Balasko and Shell [4], but in addition we allow for multiple agents per
period. Our approach is set-theoretic and geometrical. The consumers characteristics
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are described by their consumption sets, their preference sets and the associated nor-
mal cones. We give conditions of Pareto optimality, under very basic assumptions, by
providing a simple and geometric version of the proof of Balasko and Shell [4].
Balasko and Shell [4] provide a criterion based on the asymptotic behavior of the norm
of the prices to characterize Pareto optimal allocation without durable good or infinitely
lived asset. Burke [17] revisits this criterion by focusing in particular on the right
definition of the Gaussian curvature of the indifference surface. Actually, these authors
provide a proof with a first step considering the special case of a single commodity per
period. Then, the generalization to several commodities is only sketched.
Our purpose in this paper is three fold: to provide a simpler, direct proof of the Balasko-
Shell Criterion considering in one step several consumers for each generation and sev-
eral commodities; to encompass the case of non-complete, non-transitive preferences;
to compute explicitly a Pareto improving transfer when the allocation does not satisfy
the Balasko-Shell Criterion. Nevertheless, note that the structure of the proof is based
strongly on Balasko-Shell’s one.
It is important to remark that a geometrical approach has already been provided by
Borglin and Keiding [16]. [16] considers infinite horizons economies, and treats the
particular case of OLG models. They center the notion of Pareto optimality to its weak
form, and consider characterizations based on parameters that describe the economy
such as supporting prices and curvatures of indifference surfaces, thus an approach that
easily meets our model.
We consider this contribution as a first step to be able in future works to tackle the
question in presence of durable commodities and with heterogeneous longevities of the
agents.
Throughout these three chapters, we have raised aditionnal issues but we have also
accumulated further tools and intuitions that will be important and helpful for further
studies, especially in production economies where increasing returns are allowed and
thus growth can be expected.

Chapter 2
Existence of an equilibrium in an
OLG model with increasing
returns
Abstract
We consider a standard overlapping generations economy with a simple demographic
structure where a new cohort of agents appears at each period and whose economic
activity is extended over two successive periods, and finitely many firms are active
forever. The production possibilities are described by a sequence of production set-valued
mappings and the main innovation comes from the fact that we allow for increasing
returns to scale of more general type of non-convexities. To describe the behavior of the
firms, we consider loss-free pricing rules, which covers the case of the average pricing
rule, the competitive behavior when the firms have convex production sets, and the
competitive behavior with quantity constraints a` la Dehez-Dre`ze. We prove the existence
of an equilibrium under assumptions, which are at the same level of generality than the
ones for the existence in an exchange economy1.
JEL classification: C62, D50, D62.
Keywords: Overlapping generations model, increasing returns to scale, loss-free pric-
ing rules, equilibrium, existence
1This paper is based on “Existence of an equilibrium in an OLG model with increasing returns” [13]
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2.1 Introduction
Overlapping generations models are studied both in microeconomics and in macroe-
conomics to analyze intertemporal phenomena. These models involve infinitely many
dates, goods and consumers. This double infinity is source of many unobservable phe-
nomenons in Arrow-Debreu economy even if the space of goods is of infinite dimension.
Regarding the production side, if we consider endogenous growth models, externalities
might be introduced for example via the level of human capital, which are source of
increasing returns at the aggregate level. But these returns are not taken into account
by the agents, who have a myopic behavior in the sense that they do not care about the
externalities they create.
We thus plan to study a standard overlapping generations model with production allow-
ing increasing returns to scale and a behavior of the producers, which goes beyond the
competitive one.
The basic model is the one introduced [3–5], see also [57] for a very intuitive approach.
The production knowledge of a producer is described by generalized production corre-
spondences, which define the possible outputs at one date given the vector of inputs
consumed at the previous date. This sequential approach of the production allows to
consider innovation along the time and heterogeneity of producers.
The equilibrium concept is the standard one but for the behavior of the producers since
we do not assume that the production sets are convex. Hence the standard competitive
behavior is meaningless.
In models allowing for non-convex technologies, the firms follow general pricing rules to
describe a large range of possible behaviors including the profit maximizing behavior
at given prices. The literature considers pricing rules which associate a set of admis-
sible prices to a weakly efficient production. For a comprehensive introduction see
[10, 22, 26, 59]. Since the production is defined in a recursive way, we propose to define
also the pricing rule recursively, so that the prices for two successive dates depend on
the production possibilities for these two dates and not for the other ones.
We consider loss-free pricing rules, meaning that the firms are restricted to get a non
negative profit over two successive periods. This covers the case of the average pricing
rule, the competitive behavior when the firms have convex production sets, and the
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competitive behavior with quantity constraints a` la Dehez-Dre`ze, [23, 24].
Contrary to the case of a constant return technology, it is crucial to determine how
profits (or losses) of producers are distributed among consumers. Indeed, the optimality
of the equilibrium allocation depends on the repartition scheme. In this first paper,
we only consider private ownership economies and we assume that the shares are given
exogenously. It would be meaningful to introduce a stock market at each date allowing
the old generation to sell the shares to the young generation.
In this paper, we provide an existence result under sufficient conditions at the same level
of generality than those for an exchange economy. On the production side, we need to
assume the free-disposal condition as for the static models. On the pricing rule, we just
need a continuity condition.
2.2 Description of the model
We consider an economy with infinitely many dates (t = 1, 2 · · · ). For all t ∈ N∗, there
exists a finite set Lt of commodities available in the world. We denote #Lt = Lt.
Consumers
At each period t ∈ N (including at period 0), a finite and non-empty set of consumers
It, called generation t, are born. We denote #It = It and I = ∪t∈NIt. Each individual
lives two periods (an agent born at period t lives at t and t+ 1 and is assumed to have
no economic activity before t and after t+ 1).
The consumption set of each individual i ∈ It, t ≥ 1 is the subset Xi = RLt+ × RLt+1+ .
Thus consumption of each consumer of generation t is limited to his lifetime t and t+ 1.
The consumption set of consumers of generation 0 is RL1+ .
Consumers preferences are represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R. This means
that preferences are complete and transitive.
The vector ei ∈ RLt++ × RLt+1++ represents the initial endowment of the agent i of the
generation t, which is null outside his lifetime.
Producers
We assume the set of producers J to be finite. Each firm is supposed to be active for
all dates. We denote #J = J .
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The production possibilities are represented by production set-valued production map-
pings which associate to a given vector of inputs at date t, a set of possible outputs
produced at the next period. This supposes that the production process takes time,
the consumption of an input at date t has no influence on the output at this date. For
each firm j, (F jt )
∞
t=1 is a sequence of mappings from −RLt+ to RLt+1 . For a given inputs
vector zjt , F
j
t (z
j
t ) is the set of possible vector of outputs the firm can produce. We do
not assume the nonnegativity of the output vectors in order to allow for productions
with free-disposal, but the hypothesis we posit later in the next section will show that
only the nonnegative output vectors will be relevant.
Let us associate to each firm j at each period t an elementary production set Zjt defined
by:
Zjt = {(zjt , ζjt+1) ∈ −RLt+ × RLt+1 | ζjt+1 ∈ F jt (zjt )}
Notice that Ztj is the graph of the mapping F
j
t . We define the global inter-temporal
production set of firm j by:
Y j =
{
(yjt )
∞
t=1 ∈
∞∏
t=1
RLt | ∀t,∃(zjt , ζjt+1) ∈ Zjt : yjt = zjt + ζjt with ζj1 = 0
}
We remark that, although we suppose firms to be active forever, we do not exclude the
possibility of firms starting at each date t and operating only for two successive dates t
and t + 1 as in Tvede [57]. In this case, we call for all t ≥ 1, Jt the finite set of firms
started at each date t. Thus, firm j ∈ Jt is active at dates t and t + 1, and inactive at
dates t′ 6= t, t+1. We can thus consider the sequence of set-valued mapping (F jt )t where
(F jt′)t′ are identically null, if t 6= t, t+ 1
Feasibility condition
An allocation ((xi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J ) ∈
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i ×∏j∈J Y j is feasible if for all t ∈ N∗,
it satisfies the market-clearing condition:
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
j∈J
yjt (2.1)
We denote by A(E) the set of feasible allocations.
Pricing Rule
The price vector p is an element of
∏∞
t=1R
Lt
+ , and pth is the market price of the com-
modity h at date t.
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Since the model we consider allows for increasing returns, the producers behavior can-
not only be characterized by a competitive and profit maximization behavior. So we
describe the behavior of the producers by general pricing rules. See Cornet [22], Dierker,
Guesnerie and Neuefeind [26] and Villar [59] for a survey on the representation of eco-
nomic behavior of producers by pricing rules. All the firms are allowed to follow different
pricing rules. Since the production possibilities are defined in a recursive way, we define
the pricing rule in a similar way. This approach corresponds to the idea that at each
period, newly born individuals appear, taking part to the economic decisions thus to the
determination of productions carried over their lifetime. For a producer j at a period t,
the pricing rule ϕjt is a set-valued mapping defined on the set of weakly efficient produc-
tions of Zjt with values in R
Lt
+ × RLt+1+ . So, given a weakly efficient production yj ∈ Y j
and a price p, the pair (yj , p) is compatible with the behavior of the jth producer if for
all t, (pt, pt+1) ∈ ϕjt (zjt , ζjt+1) where (zjt , ζjt+1) ∈ Zjt and yjt = zjt + ζjt .
A state ((yj), p) is called a production equilibrium if for all t, each firm j ∈ J finds
acceptable the price (pt, pt+1) according to his pricing rule for the given weakly produc-
tion plan (yj), that is for all j ∈ J , (pt, pt+1) ∈ ϕjt (zjt , ζjt+1), where (zjt , ζjt+1) ∈ Zjt and
yjt = z
j∗
t + ζ
j
t .
Budget Constraint
We assume that we are in a private ownership economy. Each agent i ∈ It holds a share
θij ≥ 0 of the firm j such that for all j, ∑i∈It θij = 1.
The budget constraint, for each agent i ∈ It, t ∈ N∗ is given by:
pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 ≤ pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 +
∑
j∈J
θij(pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1)
and for i ∈ I0, p1 · xi1 ≤ p1 · ei1
Equilibrium
We are now able to state the definition of an equilibrium in this overlapping generation
economy with production.
Definition 2.2.1. An equilibrium in the OLG economy E is an element
(p∗, (xi∗), (yj∗)) ∈∏∞t=1RLt+ ×∏i∈I Xi ×∏j∈J Y j such that:
a) for all t ∈ N∗, for all i ∈ It, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xi | p∗t · xit + p∗t+1 · xit+1 ≤ p∗t · eit + p∗t+1 · eit+1 +
∑
j∈J
θij(p∗t · zj∗t + p∗t+1 · ζj∗t+1)},
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and, for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set
{xi ∈ Xi | p∗1 · xi1 ≤ p∗1 · ei1};
b) for all j ∈ J , for all t, (p∗t , p∗t+1) ∈ ϕjt (zj∗t , ζj∗t+1), where (zj∗t , ζj∗t+1) ∈ Zjt and yj∗t =
zj∗t + ζ
j∗
t ;
c) for all t ∈ N∗, ∑i∈It−1∪It xi∗t = ∑i∈It−1∪It eit +∑j∈J yj∗t .
An equilibrium is thus a list of prices and allocations such that: (a) every consumer
maximizes her utility at given prices within her budget set; (b) all the firms are at
equilibrium at ((yj∗), p∗); and (c) all markets clear at every date t ∈ N∗.
2.3 Existence of equilibrium
We consider standard assumptions on the consumption side.
Assumption C.
a) For all t ∈ N∗, for all individuals i ∈ It, Xi = RLt+ × RLt+1+ and for all i ∈ I0,
Xi = RL1+ .
b) For all individuals in I, ui is continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-satiated;
c) For all t ∈ N∗, there exists i0(t) ∈ It such that for all xt ∈ RLt+ , ui0(t)(xt, ·) is locally
non-satiated and i1(t) ∈ It such that for all xt+1 ∈ RLt+1+ , ui1(t)(·, xt+1) is locally
non-satiated.
Assumption E. For all t ∈ N∗, for all i ∈ It, ei ∈ RLt++ × RLt+1++ and for all i ∈ I0,
ei ∈ RL1++.
We posit the following assumption on the production mappings.
Assumption F.
a) For all (j, t) ∈ J × N∗, F jt has a closed graph;
b) for all zjt ∈ −RLt+ , 0 ∈ F jt (zjt );
c) for all zjt ∈ −RLt+ , F jt (zjt ) ∩ RLt+1+ is bounded;
d) for all zjt , z
j′
t ∈ −RLt+ , if ztj ≤ zj′t then F jt (zj′t ) ⊂ F jt (ztj);
e) F jt (z
j
t ) = (F
j
t (z
j
t ) ∩ RLt+1+ )− RLt+1+ .
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Assumption F implies that Y j is closed for the product topology and satisfies the posibil-
ity of inaction and the free-disposal assumption. The set of weakly efficient production
plans coincides then with the frontier of the production set. Furthermore, negative
outputs correspond to the disposal of some part of the production. We do not make
assumptions on the returns to scale, thus increasing returns are allowed.
We make the following regularity condition on the pricing rule. As pointed in Bonnis-
seau and Cornet [10], this regularity condition helps to avoid the case where the set of
admissible prices is reduced to a singleton, otherwise there is no possibility of equilibria.
Assumption PR. For all (j, t) ∈ J × N∗,
a) ϕjt has a closed graph and for all (z
j
t , ζ
j
t+1) ∈ ∂Zjt , ϕjt (zjt , ζjt+1) is a closed convex
cone in RLt+ × RLt+1+ different from {(0, 0)};
b) for all (zjt , ζ
j
t+1) ∈ ∂Zjt , for all (pt, pt+1) ∈ ϕjt (zjt , ζjt+1), if ζt+1,k < 0 then pt+1,k = 0.
Although losses are possible in the presence of increasing returns, we will particularly
focus on loss-free pricing rules: only combinations of prices and productions yielding
nonnegative profits will be found acceptable by the producers.
Assumption LF. (Loss-free assumption) For all (j, t) ∈ J ×N, for all (zjt , ζjt+1) ∈ Zjt ,
for all (pt, pt+1) ∈ ϕjt (zjt , ζjt+1),
pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1 ≥ 0
Assumption LF is naturally associated to firms which operate in unregulated markets
and where inaction is possible: in this way, whenever the markets conditions are not
advantageous, the owners of the firms can always decide to close them down without
incuring any cost, thus profits are guaranteed to stay nonnegative.
Pricing rules satisfying Assumptions PR and LF always exist. Villar in [59] has pointed
out two main examples: the constrained profit maximization and the mark-up pricing
rule.
In our framework, the constrained profit maximization is given by:
ϕjCPMt (z
j
t , ζ
j
t+1) = {(pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ ×RLt+1+ \ (0, 0) | pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1 ≥ pt · zj′t + pt+1 ·
ζj′t+1,∀(zj′t , ζj′t+1) ∈ Zjt , with zj′t+1 ≥ zjt+1}, for (zjt , ζjt+1) 6= (0, 0),
ϕjCPMt (0, 0) is the closed convex hull of (pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ ×RLt+1+ \ (0, 0) for which there
exist sequences (zjνt , ζ
jν
t+1) ∈ ∂Zjt \ {(0, 0)} and (pνt , pνt+1) ∈ RLt+ × RLt+1+ , such that
(zjνt , ζ
jν
t+1)→ (0, 0) and (pνt , pνt+1)→ (pt, pt+1) with (pνt , pνt+1) ∈ ϕjCPMt (zjνt , ζjνt+1).
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This pricing rule results in combinations of prices and productions such that no other
combinations using fewer inputs but yielding to higher profits are possible. It can be
used to modelize the behaviour of firms when the increasing returns are due to fixed
costs or the use of a fixed capital like land or machinery.
In order to introduce the mark-up pricing rule, we define the average cost pricing rules
as combinations of prices and productions plans which make firms to just break even:
ϕjACt (z
j
t , ζ
j
t+1) = {(pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ ×RLt+1+ | pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1 = 0}, if (zjt , ζjt+1) 6= (0, 0),
ϕjACt (0, 0) is the closed convex hull of (pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ × RLt+1+ \ (0, 0) for which there
exist sequences (zjνt , ζ
jν
t+1) ∈ ∂Zjt \ {(0, 0)} and (pνt , pνt+1) ∈ RLt+ × RLt+1+ , such that
(zjνt , ζ
jν
t+1)→ (0, 0) and (pνt , pνt+1)→ (pt, pt+1) with pνt · zjνt + pνt+1 · ζjνt+1 = 0}.
Fom the average-cost pricing rule, we define the “mark-up pricing”as ϕjACt (z
j
t (1 +
ρjt ), ζ
j
t+1). This pricing rule thus consists of prices that cover the costs of the firms
to which is added a profit component ρjt called mark-up. A mark-up can be related
conditions on the firms, such as the existence of fixed cots, fixed capital or the presence
of entry barriers. By definition of the average-cost pricing rule, ρjt = −
pt·zjt+pt+1·ζjt+1
pt·zjt
;
this ratio expresses the measure of the profitability of firm j when it advances some
capital or investment at date t.
Clearly, average cost pricing is a particular mark-up pricing where the mark-up is equal
to zero.
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 2.3.1. Under Assumptions C, E, F, PR and LF, the OLG economy E has an
equilibrium.
Remark 2.3.1. This result encompasses the known existence results for exchange economies.
Indeed, it suffices to consider that there is only one producer with a constant production
correspondence Ft defined by Ft(zt) = −RLt+1+ and the pricing rule corresponding to the
competitive behavior, that is,
ϕt(zt, ζt+1) = {(pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ × RLt+1+ | pt · zt + pt+1 · ζt+1 = 0}.
Remark 2.3.2. If we further assume that F jt has a convex graph for all (j, t) and that
the pricing rule ϕjt describes the competitive behavior, that is,
ϕjt (z
j
t , ζ
j
t+1) = {(pt, pt+1) ∈ RLt+ × RLt+1+ | pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1 ≥ pt · zj′t + pt+1 ·
ζj′t+1,∀(zj′t , ζj′t+1) ∈ Zjt },
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then Assumptions PR and LF are satisfied and Theorem 2.3.1 gives the existence of a
competitive equilibrium in the OLG economy.
Remark 2.3.3. Note that Assumption PR (b) implies that for all t ∈ N∗, for all k ∈ Lt+1,
then ζj∗t+1,k ≥ 0 if commodity k is desirable by at least one consumer of generation t or
t + 1. So, even if we do not a priori exclude negative quantities of output when we
define the production mappings, at equilibrium, the production of an output is always
non negative for desirable commodities.
2.4 Equilibrium in truncated economies
We will proceed as in exchange economies (see Balasko et al. [3]) to establish the
existence of equilibrium in E : first we show the existence of pseudo-equilibrium in the
truncated economies with a finite horizon
Eτ =
(
(uτi, Xτi, eτi, θi)i∈Iτ−10 , (Y
tj , ϕ˜tj)t=1,...,τ−1
j∈J
)
then we prove that prices and allocations remains in a compact space of a suitable linear
space and we finally show that a cluster point is an equilibrium of the OLG economy.
Notations.
Iτ−10 = ∪τ−1t=0 It is the set of all the individuals born up to period τ − 1.
For each i ∈ I1,
Xτi = {x ∈∏τt=1RLt+ | xt′ = 0, ∀t′ > 1}
uτi(x) = ui(x1)
eτi = (eτit′ )
τ
t′=1 such that e
τi
1 = e
i
1, and e
τi
t′ = 0 if t
′ > 1.
For each t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, for each i ∈ It,
Xτi = {x ∈∏τt=1RLt+ | xt′ = 0, ∀t′ 6= t, t+ 1}
uτi(x) = ui(xt, xt+1)
eτi = (eτit′ )
τ
t′=1 such that e
τi
t = e
i
t, e
τi
t+1 = e
i
t+1 and e
τi
t′ = 0 if t
′ 6= t, t+ 1.
For each t, we choose an arbitrary closed convex cone Ct, called free-disposal cone,
included in RLt++ ∪ {0} containing 1t = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RLt++ ∪ {0} in its interior. We denote
by C+t the positive polar cone of Ct
2.
2C+t = {v ∈ RLt | v · u ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ Ct}
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We define the extended production set Y tj for t = 1, . . . , τ − 1 as follows:
Y tj = {(ytjt′ )τt′=1 ∈
τ∏
t′=1
RLt′ | (ytjt , ytjt+1) ∈ Zjt , ∀t′, ytjt′ ∈ −Ct′}
This extension is necessary since the existence result for economies with non-convex
production sets require that the production sets satisfies the free-disposal assumption or
at least a weak form of it, namely, with our notations the fact that Y tj−∏τt′=1Ct′ = Y tj .
We also extend the pricing rules as follows: for all ytj ∈ ∂Ytj ,
ϕ˜tj(ytj) = {p ∈
τ∏
t′=1
C+t | (pt, pt+1) ∈ ϕjt (ytjt , ytjt+1), pt′ · ytjt′ = 0, ∀t′ 6= t, t+ 1}
We thus extend the production sets into
∏τ
t′=1RLt′ , but we focus only on the production
at date t and restrict the activity at dates t′ 6= t to the free disposal at zero cost. We
also remark that if p ∈ ϕ˜tj(ytj) and pt′ ∈ RLt′+ \ {0} for some t′ 6= t, t+ 1, then ytjt′ = 0.
The truncation of the economy leads us to a weak notion of equilibrium termed as
pseudo-equilibrium.
Definition 2.4.1. A pseudo-equilibrium in the truncated economy Eτ is an element
(p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) ∈∏τt=1C+t ×∏i∈Iτ−10 Xτi ×∏j∈J ∏τ−1t=1 Y tj such that:
a) for all t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 1, for all i ∈ It, xi∗ is a maximal element of uτi in the budget
set
{xi ∈ Xτi | p∗ · xi ≤ p∗ · eτi +
∑
j∈J
θijt p
∗ · ytj∗};
for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ is a maximal element of uτi in the budget set {xi ∈ Xτi | p∗·xi ≤ p∗·eτi};
b) for all j ∈ J , for all t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, p∗ ∈ ϕ˜tj(ytj∗);
c) For all t = 1, . . . , τ−1,∑i∈Iτ−10 xi∗t = ∑i∈Iτ−10 eτit +∑j∈J ∑τ−1t′=1 yt′j∗t and∑i∈Iτ−10 xi∗τ ≤∑
i∈Iτ−10 e
τi
τ +
∑
i∈Iτ e
i
τ +
∑
j∈J
∑τ−1
t′=1 y
t′j∗
τ
Remark 2.4.1. The difference between a pseudo-equilibrium and an equilibrium is that
we do not require the market clearing condition at the last period τ and we artificially
increase the initial endowments by adding those of the consumers of the generation τ .
This particular feature is useful to show below that if τ ′ > τ , then the restriction of a
pseudo-equilibrium of Eτ ′ to the τ − 1 first generations is a pseudo-equilibrium of Eτ .
Remark 2.4.2. Since Condition (c) of the above definition is weaker on the last period
τ than the standard market clearing condition, an equilibrium of Eτ is clearly a pseudo-
equilibrium.
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Remark 2.4.3. In the definition of a pseudo-equilibrium, the price p∗ is supposed to be
in
∏τ
t=1C
+
t . Actually, we remark that it belongs to the smaller set
∏τ
t=1R
Lt
+ . This is
a consequence of Condition (b) and the fact that ϕjt takes its values in R
Lt
+ × RLt+1+ .
Consequently, we deduce from the definition of ϕ˜tj that at equilibrium ytj∗t′ = 0 for all
t′ 6= t, t+ 1.
Remark 2.4.4. From the definition of the truncated economy and the definition of a
pseudo-equilibrium, we remark that if τ¯ > τ and (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) is a pseudo-equilibrium
in the economy Eτ¯ , then the price and the allocations restricted to the τ first periods(
q∗, (χi∗)i∈Iτ−10 , (ξ
tj∗) j∈J
t=1,...,τ−1
)
defined by
q∗ = (p∗t )τt=1,
for all i ∈ Iτ−10 , χi∗ = (xi∗t )τt=1,
for all j ∈ J , for all t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, ξtj∗ = (ytj∗t′ )τt′=1,
is a pseudo-equilibrium in the economy Eτ .
Indeed, from the definition of a pseudo-equilibrium, we just have to look at Condition
(c) for the period τ . Since (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) is a pseudo-equilibrium in the economy Eτ¯
and τ¯ > τ , one has: ∑
i∈I τ¯−10
xi∗τ =
∑
i∈I τ¯−10
eτ¯ iτ +
∑
j∈J
τ¯−1∑
t′=1
yt
′j∗
τ
From the definition of X τ¯ i, for all i ∈ ∪τ¯−1t=τ+1It, xi∗τ = 0. From the definition of eτ¯ i, for
all i ∈ ∪τ¯−1t=τ+1It, eτ¯ iτ = 0. From the previous remark, for all t′ = τ + 1, . . . , τ¯ − 1, for all
j, yt
′j∗
τ = 0. Furthermore, for all j, y
τj∗
τ ≤ 0 and for all i ∈ Iτ , xi∗τ ≥ 0. So, one deduces
that
∑
i∈I τ¯−10
xi∗τ =
∑
i∈Iτ−10
xi∗τ +
∑
i∈Iτ
xi∗τ =
∑
i∈Iτ−10
eτ¯ iτ +
∑
i∈Iτ
eτ¯ iτ +
∑
j∈J
τ−1∑
t′=1
yt
′j∗
τ +
∑
j∈J
yτj∗τ
which implies that
∑
i∈Iτ−10
xi∗τ ≤
∑
i∈Iτ−10
eτ¯ iτ +
∑
i∈Iτ
eτ¯ iτ +
∑
j∈J
τ−1∑
t′=1
yt
′j∗
τ
So we get Condition (c) for the period τ since xi∗τ = χi∗τ and eτ¯ iτ = eτiτ for all i ∈ Iτ−10
and eτ¯ iτ = e
i
τ for all i ∈ Iτ .
Since the truncated economy Eτ does not satisfy the strong survival assumption but its
weak form, we are going to deduce the existence of pseudo-equilibrium from a quasi-
equilibrium. One has:
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Definition 2.4.2. A quasi-equilibrium in the truncated economy Eτ is a list (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗))
in
∏τ
t=1C
+
t ×
∏
i∈Iτ−10 X
τi ×∏j∈J ∏τ−1t=1 Y tj satisfying:
a’) for all t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 1, xi∗ is an element of the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xτi | p∗ · x∗i ≤ p∗ · eτi +
∑
j∈J
θijt p
∗ · ytj∗}
and for all xi ∈ Xτi such that: p∗ · xi < p∗ · eτi +
∑
j∈J θ
ij
t p
∗ · ytj , uτi(xi) ≤ uτi(xi∗),
for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ ∈ {xi ∈ Xi | p∗ · xi ≤ p∗ · eτi} and for all xi ∈ Xτi such that
p∗ · xi < p∗ · eτi, uτi(xi) ≤ uτi(xi∗),
b) for all j ∈ J , for all t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, p∗ ∈ ϕ˜τj(ytj∗);
c)
∑
i∈Iτ−10 x
i∗ =
∑
i∈Iτ−10 e
i +
∑
j∈J
∑τ−1
t=1 y
tj∗;
d) p∗ 6= 0.
Proposition 2.4.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1, for all τ ≥ 2, there exists a
quasi-equilibrium of the economy Eτ .
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that Eτ satisfies the necessary assumption of
the existence of a (quasi)-equilibrium. See Bonnisseau-Cornet [10] for the existence
of equilibrium with bounded-losses pricing rules and in particular of losses-free pricing
rules, Gourdel [37] for the existence of quasi-equilibrium and the way to go from quasi-
equilibrium to equilibrium, and Bonnisseau-Jamin [11] for the existence of equilibrium
with a weaker version of the free-disposal assumption.
Indeed, the existence of quasi-equilibrium is ensured by Assumptions (C) and (E), and
the facts that :
• ϕ˜tj satisfies Assumption (PR)(a) since ϕjt satisfies this assumption and Ct is a
closed convex cone.
• for all (ytj) ∈ ∏ ∂Y tj , if p ∈ ∩j,tϕ˜tj(ytj), p · eτi +∑j∈J θijt p · ytj ≥ 0, thanks to
Assumptions (LF) and (E), and Remark 2.4.3, that is p∗ ∈∏τt=1RLt+ .
• Y tj −∏τt′=1Ct′ = Y tj (free-disposal)
and the boundedness assumption stated by the following lemma. 
Let e ∈ ∏t∈N∗ RLt+ defined by et = ∑i∈It∪It−1 eit. Let e′ ∈ ∏t∈N∗ RLt+ such that e′ ≥ e.
We denote by A˜(Eτ (e′)), the set of allocations satisfying the market clearing condition
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for a pseudo-equilibrium (Condition (c) of Definition 3.4.1) for the economy Eτ . We
establish that feasible allocations are bounded for all greater initial endowments.
Lemma 2.1. For all e′ ≥ e, for all j ∈ J , there exists a sequence of non negative real
numbers (mtj) such that for all τ , for all ((xi), (ytj)) ∈ A˜(Eτ (e′)),
for all i ∈ Iτ−10 , for all t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, 0 ≤ xit ≤ e′t +
(∑
j∈J m
tj
)
1t;
for all j ∈ J , for all t = 1, . . . , t− 1, for all t′ 6= t+ 1,
0 ≥ ytjt′ ≥ −e′t′ −
∑
j∈J m
t′j1t
′
,
m(t+1)j1t+1 ≥ ytjt+1 ≥ −e′t+1 −
∑
j∈J m
(t+1)j1t+1.
Proof. Let ((xi), (ytj)) be an element of A˜(Eτ (e′)). Then, for all t = 1, . . . , τ ,
∑
i∈Iτ−10
xit ≤ e′t +
∑
j∈J
τ−1∑
t′=1
yt
′j
t
For all j ∈ J , we define the sequence (mtj) as follows: m1j = 0 and mt+1j is a positive
real number so that:
F jt (−e′t −
∑
j∈J m
tj1t) ⊂ mt+1j1t+1 − RLt+1+ .
Such real number exists from the boundedness Assumption F(c). Since 0 ≤∑i∈Iτ−10 xi1,
we get
∑
j∈J y
1j
1 +
∑
j∈J
∑τ−1
t=2 y
tj
1 ≥ −e′1. Since for all j ∈ J , y1j1 ≤ 0 and for all
t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, ytj1 ≤ 0, we obtain 0 ≥ y1j1 ≥ −e′1, for all j and 0 ≥ ytj1 ≥ −e′1 for all t.
For the second period, we have
∑
j∈J
y1j2 +
∑
j∈J
y2j2 +
∑
j∈J
τ−1∑
t=3
ytj2 ≥ −e′2
For all j ∈ J , y2j2 ≤ 0 and for all t = 3, . . . , τ − 1, ytj2 ≤ 0. From the above inequalities
and Assumption F(d), y1j2 ∈ F j1 (y1j1 ) ⊂ F j1 (−e′1) ⊂ m2j12 − RL2+ . Thus, for all j ∈ J ,
0 ≥ ytj2 ≥ −e′2 −
∑
j∈J m
2j12, for all t = 2 · · · τ − 1,
m2j12 ≥ y1j2 ≥ −e′2 −
∑
j 6=j′ y
1j′
2 ≥ −e′2 −
∑
j 6=j′m
2j′12 ≥ −e′2 −
∑
j′∈J m
2j′12
By an induction argument taking into account the definition of the sequences (mtj) we
prove the result for all period.
For the consumptions, since they are all non-negative, 0 ≤ xi ≤∑i′∈Iτ−10 xi′ . So, for all
t,
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0 ≤ xit ≤ e′t +
∑
j∈J
∑τ−1
t′=1 y
t′j
t ≤ e′t +
∑
j∈J y
t−1j
t ≤ e′t +
∑
j∈J m
tj1t

The following lemma ensures that a quasi-equilibrium in Eτ is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2. If (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) is a quasi-equilibrium, then p∗t 6= 0 for all t and
(p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) is an equilibrium.
Proof. Since the utility functions are continuous, the condition for a quasi-equilibrium
(p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) to be an equilibrium is that the indidvidual wealth is strictly above the
subsistence level, that is: wi∗ = p∗ · eτi +∑j∈J θijt p∗ · ytj∗ > inf p∗.Xτi, for all i ∈ Iτ−10 .
As already remarked (See Remark 2.4.3), p∗ ∈∏τt=1RLt+ , so inf p∗.Xτi = 0. Hence, from
Assumptions E and LF, it suffices to show that p∗t 6= 0 for all t = 1, . . . , τ .
Suppose that there exists t such that p∗t = 0. Knowing that p∗ is not equal to 0, there
exists t¯ such that p∗¯t 6= 0 and p∗¯t+1 = 0 or p∗¯t = 0 and p∗¯t+1 6= 0. We deal with the first
case, the proof being the same for the second case.
Since p∗¯t ∈ RLt¯+ \ {0}, the consumer i1 in It¯ given by Assumption C(c) has a strictly
positive wealth wi1∗ > 0. Then (xi1∗
t¯
, xi1∗
t¯+1
) is a demand of consumer i1. But, then,
the local non-satiation of the partial utility function ui1(xi1∗
t¯
, ·) is incompatible with
p∗¯t+1 = 0.
Thus, necessarily p∗t 6= 0 for all t, and wi∗ > inf p∗.Xτi = 0.

From Remark 2, an equilibrium is a pseudo-equilibrium, thus we have proved the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 2.4.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1, for all τ ≥ 2, there exists a
pseudo-equilibrium of the economy Eτ .
In the following lemma, we provide two properties of the pseudo-equilibrium, which
will be useful for the limit argument in the next section. In the following, a non zero
equilibrium price p∗ is normalized so that
∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈Lt p
∗
t` = 1.
Lemma 2.3. If (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗) is a pseudo-equilibrium, then p∗t 6= 0 for all t.
The set of pseudo-equilibria of the economy Eτ with a normalized price is closed.
Proof. The first part uses the same argument as for Lemma 2.2.
We now consider a sequence of pseudo-equilibria (pν , (xiν), (ytjν)) that converges to
(p¯, (x¯i), (y¯tj). We prove that (p¯, (x¯i), (y¯tj) is also a pseudo-equilibrium.
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It is easy to establish that (p¯, (x¯i), (y¯tj) satisfies the condition (b) in Definition 2, since
ϕ˜τj has closed graph, and also the condition (c). So it remains to show that the condition
(a) is also satisfied.
Denote by (wiν) the associated wealth sequence and by w¯i its limit. One easily shows
that the budget constraint is satisfied by x¯i. If w¯i > 0, then x¯i maximizes the utility
function under the budget constraint. Indeed, if p¯ · xi < w¯i, then for ν large enough,
pν · xi ≤ wiν . But this implies that ui(xi) ≤ ui(xiν), and by the continuity of ui,
ui(xi) ≤ ui(x¯i). If p¯ · xi = w¯i > 0. Let λ < 1. Then p¯ · (λxi) < w¯i. So, from above,
ui(λxi) ≤ ui(x¯i). Using again the continuity of ui, ui(xi) = limλ→1 ui(λxi) ≤ ui(x¯i).
Let us now prove that p¯t 6= 0, for all t. Since p¯ 6= 0 by normalization, there exists t
such that p¯t 6= 0. Hence, for the consumer i0(t) ∈ It and i1(t − 1) ∈ It−1, w¯i0(t) > 0
and w¯i1(t−1) > 0. So the agents i0(t) and i1(t − 1) are utility maximizer hence, from
Assumption C(c), p¯t+1 6= 0 and p¯t−1 6= 0. Doing again the same argument, we conclude
that the prices at each period is different from 0.
Since p¯t 6= 0, for all t, w¯i > 0 for all consumers, hence all of them are maximizing utility
at the price p¯. 
2.5 From truncated equilibria to equilibrium
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 consists of considering a sequence of pseudo-equilibrium in
the truncated economy with an horizon increasing to infinity. First, we establish that
the sequence of equilibrium prices in the truncated economies remains in a compact set
for the product topology on
∏∞
t=1RLt . Then we show that the sequence of T -equilibrium
remains in a compact set and we prove that a cluster point is an equilibrium of the OLG
economy E .
From the previous section, for all T ≥ 2, there exists a T -equilibrium (pT , (xiT ), (ytjT ))
of the economy ET . Since we have proved in the previous section (see Lemma 2.2) that
pT1 6= 0, we normalize pT so that
∑
`∈L1 p
T
1` = 1.
We extend the price and the allocations to the whole space
∏∞
t=1RLt by adding zeros for
the missing components without modifying the notations. So, now the sequences (pT ),
(xiT ) and (ytjT ) are in
∏∞
t=1RLt .
We now prove that the sequence of prices (pT ) remains in a compact subset of
∏∞
t=1RLt .
Lemma 2.4. For all t, there exists k˜t ∈ R+ such that for all T , 0 ≤ pTt ≤ k˜t1t.
Existence of equilibrium in OLG models with increasing returns 31
Proof. If it is not true, there exist t¯ and an increasing sequence (T ν) such that
pT
ν
t¯ ≥ ν1t¯. Let τ > t¯+ 2. We assume without any loss of generality that T ν > τ for all
ν.
Now we consider the restriction to the τ first period of the T ν-equilibrium (pT
ν
, (xiT
ν
), (ytjT
ν
)):
- for all i ∈ Iτ−10 , xiν is the restriction of xiT
ν
to
∏τ
t=1RLt ;
- for all j ∈ J , for all t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, ytjν is the restriction of ytjT ν to ∏τt=1RLt ;
- pν is the restriction of pT
ν
to
∏τ
t=1RLt .
From Remark 2.4.4 in the previous section, (pν , (xiν), (ytjν)) is a pseudo-equilibrium of
the truncated economy Eτ . We now renormalize the price pν as follows:
piν =
1∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈Lt p
ν
t`
pν
Since piν is non negative, the sequence piν remains in the simplex of
∏τ
t=1RLt , which
is compact. From Lemma 2.1 in the previous section, the sequence (xiν), (ytjν)) re-
mains in the compact subset A˜(Eτ (e)). So the sequence (piν , (xiν), (ytjν)) has a cluster
point (p¯i, (x¯i), (y¯tj)). From Lemma 3.2, (p¯i, (x¯i), (y¯tj)) is also a pseudo-equilibrium of
the truncated economy Eτ . But p¯i1 = 0 since (
∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈Lt p
ν
t`) converges to +∞ and
0 ≤ pν1` ≤ 1 for all ` ∈ L1. Hence we get a contradiction since Lemma 3.2 shows that for
all t = 1, . . . , τ , p¯it 6= 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
From Lemma 2.1 and the above lemma, the sequence of T -equilibrium of the economy
ET , (pT , (xiT ), (ytjT )), remains in a compact set for the product topology of
∏∞
t=1RLt ×∏∞
t′=1
∏
i∈It′
∏∞
t=1RLt ×
∏
j∈J
∏∞
t′=1
∏∞
t=1RLt . Since this is a countable product of
finite dimensional spaces, the product topology is metrizable on the compact sets and
there exists a sub-sequence (pT
ν
, (xiT
ν
), (ytjT
ν
)) of (pT , (xiT ), (ytjT )), which converges
to (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)). We recall that the convergence for the product topology implies the
usual convergence when we consider only a finite number of components.
For each τ ≥ 2, for ν large enough, the restriction of (pT ν , (xiT ν ), (ytjT ν )) to the τ
first periods is a pseudo-equilibrium of Eτ (see Remark 2.4.4 and it converges to the
restriction of (p∗, (xi∗), (ytj∗)) to the τ first periods. From Lemma 3.2, this restriction is
a pseudo-equilibrium of Eτ . From Definition 3.4.1 and the notations above, one deduces
that (p∗, (ξi∗), (yj∗)) defined as follows in an equilibrium for the OLG economy E :
- for all t ≥ 1, for all i ∈ It, ξi∗ = (xi∗t , xi∗t+1) and for all i ∈ I0, ξi∗ = xi∗1 ;
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- for all j ∈ J for all t ≥ 1, zj∗t = ytj∗t , ζj∗t+1 = ytj∗t+1 and yj∗t = zj∗t + ζj∗t with ζj∗0 = 0. 
2.6 A Numerical Example
This subsection intends to illustrate a case of a simple stationary OLG economy with a
single firm. At every date t ≥ 1, there is only one good |Lt| = 1, and one individual per
generation |It| = 1.
Consumers
All consumers are identical except the old consumer at date t = 0. They live two
periods, and are described by their consumption set X = R2+, their initial endowment
vector (ey, eo) and their utility function u : X → R. The consumer at date t = 0 who is
old at date t = 1 has consumption set R+.
We consider a standard time-separable utility function, namely the Cobb-Doublas utility
function: u(xyt , x
o
t ) = a lnx
y
t + (1− a) lnxot , 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
The firm
The firm is described by a production function f : −R+ → R which transforms the good
at date t into the good at date t+ 1.
We assume that f is of the form: f(zt) =
−γ(zt − zˆ), if zt ≤ zˆ ≤ 00, if zˆ ≤ zt ≤ 0, where γ > 1,
zˆ < 0 and zt ≤ 0 the input used at date t. The output at time t + 1 is then given by:
ζt+1 = f(zt).
This technology exhibits strict increasing returns due to the fixed cost zˆ.
Pricing rule
The price vector p is an element of R2+. Define the relative price: pit =
pt
pt+1
. We describe
the behavior of the producer by the average cost pricing: ptzt + pt+1ζt+1 = 0, or in term
of relative prices: pitzt + ζt+1 = 0.
The consumer’s demand
Each consumer t is maximizing her utility function ut under her budget constraint.
Given a price (pt, pt+1), the consumer t’s demand is:{
xyt =
awt
pt
= a(ey + e
o
pit
)
xot =
(1−a)wt
pt+1
= (1− a)(pitey + eo)
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Clearly, if the relative price pit increases, the agent will decrease his consumption when
young and increase it again when old. His lifetime utility is an increasing function of
pit ≥ 0. However, we note that at each period t, the relative price pit cannot be too
small. Indeed, if we let pit tend to 0
+ at date t, the consumption of young xyt will be
infinitely high while the total resource at each date is finite.
Supply function
Whenever zt ≤ zˆ, the firm can decide to produce ζt+1 = −γ(zt− zˆ) following an average
cost pricing. Thus we can write: ζt+1 = −pitzt and:
• ζt+1 = γzˆpitpit−γ
• zt = − γzˆpit−γ
Remarks:
i) zt and ζt+1 are well defined whenever pit < γ;
ii) for all t ≥ 0, for pit ∈ (0, γ), ζt+1 > 0 and zt < 0, in addition, ζt+1 is an increasing
function of pit;
iii)limpit→γ− ζt+1 = limpit→γ−
γyˆpit
pit−γ = +∞
iv) In case of constant returns to scale, that is no fixed cost, it is known that the firm,
while maximizing its profit would exhibit a discontinuous supply function. The fixed
cost associated to the average cost pricing result in a smooth supply function on the
range (0, γ).
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is an element (p∗t , (x∗o0 , (x
∗y
t , x
∗o
t )
∞
t=1), (zt,
∗ ζ∗t+1)) such that:
a) for all t, (x∗yt , x∗ot ) is a solution to
max u(xtt, x
t
t+1)
s.t pi∗t x
∗y
t + x
∗o
t ≤ wˆ∗t
b) For all t, pi∗t z∗t + ζ∗t+1 = 0;
c) x∗yt + x∗ot−1 = ey + eo + z∗t + ζ∗t−1;
where pi∗t =
p∗t
p∗t+1
Characterization of equilibria
The sequence of prices (p∗t ) is an equilibrium price system if the sequence of relative
prices (pi∗t ) is a solution to:
(1− a)ey(pit−1 − 1)− γyˆ
pit−1 − γ pit−1 = ae
o(1− 1
pit
)− γyˆ
pit − γ
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Figure 2.1: Asymptotic efficiency: when the average-cost prices tend to the marginal
cost with no fixed cost
with pit ∈ (0, γ) for all t ≥ 1, γ > 1, 0 ≥ yˆ ≥ −ey and 1 ≥ a ≥ 0.
The following figure illustrates this equation in terms of (pit−1, pit) for the particular case
where γ = 4 the initial endowment at each period ω = 2, the initial endowment when
old e = 0.8, the propension to consume when young a = 0.02, the fixed cost zˆ = −1.
Here, the consumer is ready to invest in the production since his endowment is large
enough when young and his preferences put a higher weight when old.
We have multiple steady states equilibria: a low and stable steady state pi∗ < 1 and
pi∗∗ = 1 which is not stable. Suppose that at each date t0, pit0 < 1, then the economy
will display a succession of inflationary equilibria since all the following prices will be
below 1 and will be decreasing to the low steady state pi∗. If we instead have pit0 > 1,
then the successive price pit0+1 > 1 so are all the following prices. This case will lead
to a non stationary equilibria where the relative prices will increase and tend to the
marginal price γ without reaching it, that is: 1 < pit0 < pit0+1 < . . . < γ. Thus from
period t0, the production will be increasing, so will be the welfare of all the successive
generations since they will benefit from a deflation: pt0 > pt0+1 > . . .. Thus we have an
economy which is asymptotically efficient: it converges toward an equilibrium which is
associated to an economy without fixed costs, at which the utility is at its maximum.
For instance, if u∗, u∗∗ and u¯ are respectively the utility levels at pi∗, pi∗∗ and γ, then
given the same parameters above, we have: u∗ = 0.255 < u∗∗ = 0.595 < u¯ = 1.597.
The existence of fixed cost and the average cost pricing make the firm decide to produce
at each date. So the fixed cost is not always necessarely a barrier to production. It is
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also important to remark that a production at the marginal price γ is still possible even
though it will generate losses equal to γpt+1zˆ = ptzˆ ≤ 0. Indeed, the demand would be:{
xyt = a(e
y + zˆ + e
o
γ )
xot = (1− a)(γ(ey + zˆ) + eo)
The corresponding market clearing equation gives a positive production equals to 0.768,
given the same parameters above, and the associated utility at γ is 0.344 which is clearly
lower than u∗∗ thus lower than u¯. This confirms the “superiority of average cost over
over marginal cost when pit0 > 1.
Note that the choice of a is primordial and that this result relies on the particular fact
that consumers have higher initial endowment but lower incentive to consume when
young, they are more focused on future consumption.
2.7 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
As already pointed out earlier, loss-free pricing rules are relevant in unregulated markets
and can be applied to firms whose increasing returns are due to fixed cost, or associated to
a S-shape production function, which means that the technology displays first increasing
returns to scale until some level of production then decreasing returns to scale. As
provided in Villar [59], important examples are the constrained profit maximization and
the mark-up pricing rule which also include the average-cost pricing as a particular case.
These two groups of loss-free pricing rules are known to be the closest extensions of
competitive behavior when there are increasing returns. In particular, they follow the
basic profit that a firm will produce only when the profits are non-negative, otherwise
it closes down.
Increasing returns and imperfect competition:
It is important to remark that increasing returns are usually associated to imperfect
competition. In particular, firms benefiting from increasing returns may become not
negligible since their productivity will be as high as their size, so that they have some
market power and their behavior goes beyond the price-taker’s one. These firms act
then as monopolies but because of the social inefficiencies they cause in the market, they
may be considered publicly owned thus regulated. Regulation supposes that the firms
are assigned to follow marginal pricing, which implies losses when there are increasing
returns to scale, leading us beyond the loss-free framework. This calls for the need to
model the behavior of firms with monopoly power in an unregulated approach, which
face serious difficulties when these firms are not identical and interact between them.
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Some models that treat growth theory have provided structures that permit to reconcile
competitive behavior of firms and increasing returns.
In this line, Benhabib and Farmer [7] have provided such a model in which the firms
behaviors and the associated pricing are described as follows. There is a continuum of
intermediate goods y(i), i ∈ [0, 1], they are used to produce a final consumption good
according to the production function: Y =
[∫ 1
0 (y(i))
λdi
]1/λ
where λ ∈ (0, 1). Clearly,
this production function exhibits constant returns to scale. The final good sector is
assumed to be competitive. If p(i) is the price of intermediate good i with respect to
the final good, then the problem of the final good sector is given by:
max
y(i)
{[∫ 1
0
(y(i))λdi
]1/λ
−
∫ 1
0
p(i)y(i)di
}
The first order condition implies that the demand for the intermediate goods i is given
by: y(i) = pt(i)
1/λY , or equivalently, p(i) =
(
y(i)
Y
)λ−1
, which is well defined whenever
Y > 0. The intermediate goods are, in turns produced by firms that are involved in
a monopolistic competition as in Dixit and Stiglitz [27]. Their production, a` la Cobb-
Douglas makes use of capital and labor, y(i) = K(i)αN(i)β, where α, β > 0, α+ β > 1,
thus the increasing returns to scale are introduced in the intermediate goods sector. It
is assumed that the technology used to produce intermediate goods is identical to each
firm and that the factor market is competitive so that the capital and the labor are
paid their marginal products. Let r and ω be respectively the capital rent and the wage
relative to the final consumption good. The decision of each firm consists of maximizing
for p(i) its profit: Π(i) = p(i)y(i)−ωN(i)−rK(i) = Y 1−λN(i)βλK(i)αλ−ωN(i)−rK(i).
Here, the parameter λ represents the degree of monoppoly power of each firm, and for
λ(α + β) ≤ 1, this profit function is concave in N(i) and K(i), which confirms the
consistency between increasing returns in the technology and monopolistic competition.
The first order condition gives: r = αλp(i)y(i)K(i) and ω = βλ
p(i)y(i)
N(i) . The assumption of
symmetry leads to a solution where N(i) = N , K(i) = K and p(i) = p¯. However, the
competitivity of the final good sector leads to zero profit, that is Y − ∫ 10 p¯y(i)di = 0,
and using the demand function in intermediate goods, we obtain that p(i) = p¯ = 1. But
thanks to the monopoly power λ, the intermediate goods sector makes positive profits.
Indeed, by substituting this price p¯ to the expressions of ω and r and then to pi(i), we
have that: Π :=
∫ 1
0 pi(i)di = Y (1− λ(α+ β)) > 0, whenever Y > 0 and λ(α+ β) < 1.
Structuring the production sector in this way allows firms to exploit their market power
by charging prices higher than their marginal costs, making then excess profits contrary
to the regulated approach, thus in this approach, one basically makes use a variant of
loss-free pricing rules. Indeed, in this case, the production set consists of the set of
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(K,N, Y ) such that Y ≤ KαNβ and a (weakly) efficient production (K,N, Y ) satisfies
Y = KαNβ, with α + β ≥ 1. According to the expressions of r, ω above and the fact
that the final good Y is the reference good, the application ϕ defined by ϕ(K,N, Y ) :=
(αλKα−1Nβ, βλKαNβ−1, 1), which confirms that this notion of loss-free pricing rule
gives account of models with increasing returns in macroeconomics. Here, we have an
example of mark-up pricing a` la Villar, where the mark-up, for Y > 0 is given by:
Π
Y = 1 − λ(α + β) that is positive and constant. Another way of associating increasing
returns and imperfect competition in macroeconomic models can be seen in Seegmuller
[55], where increasing returns are due to a fixed cost, firms are identical, have perfect
information on the final good’s demand, can enter or exit the market for free, behave
competitively in the factor market, and compete a` la Cournot in the final good market.
His model then shows for all the firms, a same positive mark-up that depends on the
number of active firms in the market . This case actually follows the equi-profitability
principle by Villar in [59].
Ownership transfer of firms:
Another important remark concerns the possible perpetuation of firms accross gener-
ations. Indeed, although we obtain an existence result which conditions are rather as
general as the ones used for an exchange economy, an important feature was the assump-
tion of exogenously given shares on firms, that all individuals received systematically
at their birth, this settles the distribution of profits among consumers. However, ac-
cording to the budget constraint, these profits in addition to the initial endowments are
completely spent to finance lifetime consumptions of each agent, and it is not explicitly
shown how firms can be perpetuated forever. The literature provides many ways to treat
intergenerational transfers. One of these ways is the notion of bequest: agents, supposed
altruistic, choose to devolve their properties and assets to other agents through a will
at the end of their lifetime. For instance, we can see the shares θij ’s at date t as the
bequest left to each child i ∈ It by cohort t − 1. In this way, agents can prevent the
disappearance of their firms from the economy, and their offsprings who become the new
owners of the firms will distribute the profits between them according to the shares they
have inherited, leave the ownerships to the next cohort and so on.
There is also a non altruistic way to transfer firms ownership among generations by
allowing agents to buy shares of firms through savings. Indeed, the lifetime budget
constraint implicitely supposes the existence of a hidden financial market, we can for
instance assume that each individual of cohort t decides to save si when young at rate
rt+1. The budget balance of agent i ∈ It can be spread into: pt · xit = pt · eit − si and
pt+1·xit+1 = pt+1·eit+1+si(1+rt+1). This savings can be used to invest in the firms so that
agent i holds a portfolio (θij), and si := −∑j∈J θijpt ·zjt . By assuming the no arbitrage
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conditions: −pt · zjt = 11+rt+1 pt+1 · ζ
j
t+1 and that all firms j that are active at date t have
the same return or profitability, agent i will be indifferent between holding a bond or
investing in any firm j, so that the only thing that matters is his gain at date t+ 1, that
is sirt+1 =
∑
j θ
ijpijt , where pi
j
t is the profit made by firm j at date t. We thus end up
with the same lifetime budget constraint as in our model, that is: pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 =
pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 − si + (1 + rt+1)si = pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 +
∑
j θ
ij(pt · zjt + pt+1 · ζjt+1),
for i ∈ It, t ≥ 1.
Note that assuming uniform profitability among firms is an interesting feature. Indeed,
This case is already presented above, and it captures the situation where firms operate
in the same economical environment and may face the same conditions that generate
increasing returns to scale.
However, the shares on firms, θij remains undeterminated, it is not explicitely provided
how the shares are attributed to each agent, this leavies unexplained a key element of
the model. This issue will appear again later in the next chapter, in which we also
aim at defining a plausible intergenerational transfer. The paper is partially inspired by
Magill and Quinzii in [43], and consists of a modest approach, intending to analyze the
mechanism of transfer between generations, by means of durable goods.
Chapter 3
OLG models with durable goods
Abstract
We consider a standard pure exchange overlapping generations economy. The demo-
graphic structure consists of a new cohort of agents at each period with an economic
activity extended over two successive periods. Our model incorporates durable goods
that may be stored from one period to a successive period through a linear technology.
In this model, we intend to study the mechanism of transfer between generations, and
we show that the existence of an equilibrium can be established by considering an equiv-
alent economy “without”durable goods, where the agents economic activity is extended
over three successive periods1.
JEL classification: C62, D50, D62.
Keywords: Overlapping generations model, durable goods, irreducibility, equilibrium,
existence
1This paper is based on “Existence of equilibrium in OLG economies with durable goods”, [51]
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3.1 Introduction
Many works in OLG models involve the standard hypothesis of constant returns to scale.
This hypothesis constitutes a limitation to the production sector. Indeed, by bahaving
competitively, producers will reach their maximal profit at zero. Thus, the issue on the
repartition of profits among consumers who own the firms is avoided, as well as the one on
the existence of market which allows the transfert of property right from one generation
to another one. Moving beyond this restriction constitutes one of our motivations in
a previous work [13]. In this paper, we indeed proposed to go beyond the standard
hypothesis of constant returns and considered a model of overlapping generations with
production where increasing returns are allowed. The equilibrium existence rests on
the following facts. There is a finite number of firms that are active forever but owned
successively by 2-period lived individuals who receive exogeneous shares on firms at their
birth. The producers are instructed to make non-negative profits while they choose a
combination of prices and production plans. The consumers wealth consists of the value
of their initial endowments and the profits they obtain from the firms according to
their respective shares. They use all their wealth to pay for their lifetime consumption,
leaving nothing to the next generations. Thus the transfers of property rights between
generations are excluded.
We propose then to improve this work by studying the possibility of transfer of firms
property across generations. This paper constitutes a first step to this improvement. We
are working in the line of [43] who considers a model of overlapping generations with pro-
duction. There are durable goods which depreciate over time, and they perpetuate the
firms by allowing the transmission of the ownership shares accross generations through a
stock market. However, we will first focus our attention to a pure exchange overlapping
generations model as in [3–5], but in addition, commodities can be durable. We intend
to study, in such a model, the mechanism of wealth transfer between generations, and
we consider that the existence of durable goods makes the transfer of shares between
generations meaningful.
We are in a model with infinitely many dates, and for simplicity, the set of commodities,
perishable or durable, is the same at each date. Furthermore, there is no uncertainty,
and every individual is supposed to correctly anticipate the future prices. There is a
technology that permits to store and transfer the durable goods from one period to the
next one. This storing technology is linear. The transfered good will implicitely act
like an additionnal endowment at the date it is available. This technology is considered
as a production function in the sense that a consumer who purchases a durable good
can consume it and also use it as input to produce a good at the succeeding period.
The relation between the spot prices in Proposition 3.2.1, which is like an arbitrage-free
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condition illustrates this, where price at each date can consist of two components: the
input investment and the consumption cost. Malinvaud already considers this kind of
phenomen in [44]. There, he introduces a forward market at each date, where agents
can trade goods available only in the future. We can assimilate our work to a model a`
la Malinvaud with production.
The existence of durable goods in the model implies that agents in the end of their
lifetime, will still own some goods which they will not need anymore in the next period.
Thus we introduce, at each date a futures market that allows trades of goods available in
a future date. This market helps the old generations to sell, at the end of their lifetime,
their remaining durable goods after consumption. As mentionned above, this futures
market is similar to a market of shares in a firm: at each date, old agents sell to the young
the right to dispose of the remaining durable goods. This creates an additional resource
to the old agents and a possibility for the young agents to increase their endowment
when they become old. Purchase by the young on this market can be seen as savings
that will finance the retirement of the old. The old generations, in return, will leave, at
the end of their lifetime some commodities, to which the young generations, one period
after, can have access. We can see those contracts as lifetime sale contracts called also
“viager”, where the old people can sell, for instance their house for an annuity, while
they still occupy it until the end of their life, the buyers will then own the house right
after.
In our case, there is no uncertainty, but durable goods can also act as collaterals in mort-
gage loans, in which case the reimbursement takes place one period after the agreement,
during which the borrower seizes the collateral itself. This collateral role of durable
goods is not new, it has been treated in intertemporal general equilibrium theory, as
in [36] in the case of two-period model, or also in [2] in which agents have infinte life-
time and trade long-lived assets secured by durable goods. Thus, even though default
may imply disequilibrium, by incorporating durable goods to secure assets, default be-
comes possible and equilibrium exists under standard hypothesis. In our case, in order
to establish the existence result, we make an important assumption on the desirability
of durable goods, which ensures that prices are positive, and in addition, there are no
wastes at equilibrium: all the durable goods owned by the old will be bought by the
young generations, that is all lendings will be payed back.
Our model can easily be extended to treat the case where lifetimes are uncertain and
agents may hold assets or be involved in any liability at the end of their lifetime. If
indeed, at each period, they have a probability to die in the next period, then defaults
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are prevented thanks to the durable goods that serve as collaterals to loans. In both
frameworks of certain and uncertain lifetimes, we remark that a purchase of durable
goods by old can be also the result of bequest motives, where agents are supposed to be
altruistic.
While we mainly focus on the mechanism of wealth transfer between generations, it is
important to note that many works, theoretical and empirical, on durable goods already
exist in literature, to study different issues, such as savings, borrowing constraints and
collaterals. Furthermore, since durable goods are used as components in wealth, they
are useful to study wealth distribution, see Diaz and Luenngo-Prado in [25], who in
addition relate the two with precautionary savings. In [25], for instance the liquidity or
illiquuidity nature of durable goods, have impact on the behaviour of consumers, reflect
to the notion of precautionary saving, especially when there is uncertainty or risk in
the economy. Such an issue is not treated in our case, especially since the main feature
of the durable goods we consider is their desirability, thus without taking into account
how liquid they are. Moreover, these studies which involve empirical analysis consider
durable goods which are not easily divisible, and entail very high transaction costs, as
in Martin [46]. In [25], they are assumed specific to households and cannot be traded or
rented without first converting them back to a productive capital. Our model does not
have this specificity and allows for a durable good to be divisible when sold on a future
market to the young. But in case of production, this work meets that property and goes
in the line of our aim to study the perpetuation of firms through transfers of shares and
property rights accross generations. For instance, agents partipate in firms by putting
together their investment so that each durable capital, possibly specific to each firm is
kept in its entirety.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is descibed in Section 2. We make classical
assumptions on the consumers, at the same level as for a pure exchange economy with
perishable goods, but in addition we assume that goods are desirable. A first result of the
paper establishes a relation between the spot prices and the futures prices at equilibrium.
Our main result is the existence of an equilibrium in this economy. The arbitrage-free
conditions on equilibrium prices and the condition of no wastes allow us to consider a
so-called “reduced equilibrium”. This arbitrage-free condition at equilibrium also im-
plies an indeterminacy concerning the purchase of young agents on the futures market.
Indeed, thanks to the relations between spot and futures prices like no-arbitrage con-
ditions, they will be indifferent between buying today on the futures market or buying
tomorrow on the spot market.
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We then establish the existence of the reduced equilibrium, for that we reformulate the
model into an equivalent economy “without” durable goods as defined in Section 3. In
this associated economy, all individuals will artificially live over three periods, and the
consumption sets are transformed so that they will not consist of the positive orthant
anymore. Furthermore the strong survival assumption is not satisfied since the initial
endowments are no longer interior points.
The existence result is concluded in Section 4, where the proof is similar to Balasko
et al in [3–5] but we also use the notion of irreducibility, used by Florenzano as seen
in [28, 29]. Irreducibility ensures that no matter how we allocate the individuals into
two groups, each of the groups has some good for which the other group is willing to
exchange with some goods of its own. This condition is easily obtained in our model
thanks to the presence of durable and desirable goods and the connections between all
the generations: they are indeed involved in a trade, either directly when they have
common periods of life, or indirectly, in which case, individuals of each generation will
successively act as intermediaries between them. The existence of equilibrium in the
original model with durable goods follows the existence of equilibrium in the equivalent
economy without durable goods. This passage through an equivalent economy gives
account to the involvement of durable goods in the utility of the agents.
3.2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy with discrete and infinitely many dates
(t = 1, 2 . . .).
Commodities
There exists a finite set L of commodities available for consumption and trade in the
world. We denote #L = L. Goods can be perishable or durable, and may suffer
transformations from one period to an immediate successive period.
We represent these transformations by linear mappings Γt : RL → RL which transform
each consumption xt ∈ RL+ at date t into a bundle of goods
Γt(xt) ∈ RL+ at date t + 1. The commodity ` ∈ Lt is perishable if Γt(δ`) = 0, where
δ` ∈ RL consists of one unit of commodity ` and nothing else.
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So each good can be seen as a consumption good and an input if we think of Γt as a
production function.
Consumers
A generation 0, I0, lives only one period. At each period t ∈ N∗, there is a finite and
non-empty set of consumers It called generation t, who are born and live for two periods.
We denote #It = It and I = ∪t∈NIt.
The consumption set of each individual i ∈ It is a subset Xi = RL+×RL+. The consump-
tion set of consumers of generation 0 is RL+.
Consumers preferences are represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R.
The vector ei ∈ RL×RL represents the initial endowment of the agent i of the generation
t.
Assumption C.
a) For all individuals in I, ui is continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-satiated.
b) For all t ∈ N∗, there exists i0(t) ∈ It such that ui0(t) is strictly monotonic.
Assumption C is a classical assumption in a standard finite economy.
Assumption E. For all t ∈ N∗, for all i ∈ It, ei ∈ RL++×RL++, for all i ∈ I0, ei ∈ RL++.
Markets and Prices
At each date t, there is a spot market for consumption. The price vector p is an element
of
∏∞
t=1RL+ and pt` is the spot price of commodity ` at date t.
Furthermore, we allow for trade between generations. To make clear how this trade
takes place within one period, consider an individual born at date t who purchases xit+1
when old. This consumption gives right to xit+1 at date t+1 and to Γ
t+1(xit+1) available
only at date t+2 that is, after his lifetime. So at the end of date t+1 he may wish to sell
Γt+1(xit+1) to young. We write f
i
t+1 the purchase of a young i of generation t+ 1 from
old agents of generation t at date t+1, and Πt+1 the vector price at which the trade is
agreed, the future price vector Π is an element of
∏∞
t=1RL+. We remark that f it+1 is not
available before date t+ 2. This market can be seen as a futures market, where agents
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trade goods available only in the next period.
Each individual i ∈ It purchases f it at date t from generation t − 1 at price Πt, which
is available only at date t+ 1 and gives right to Γt(f it ) at price pt+1. At date t+ 1, the
same individual earns Γt(xit) from his previous consumption and sells x
i
t+1 on the futures
market, when he is old, at the end of his lifetime. These operations are summarized by
the following budget constraint at prices (p,Π): for agent i ∈ It,
pt ·xit + pt+1 ·xit+1 + Πt · f it ≤ pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 + pt+1 ·Γt(xit) + pt+1 ·Γt(f it ) + Πt+1 ·xit+1
for agent i ∈ I0, p1 · xi1 ≤ p1 · ei1 + Π1 · xi1.
Note that the consumption when old xit+1 appears at both sides as expenditure and
additionnal income.
We denoted by Bi(p,Π) the budget constraint associated to (p,Π).
Feasibility conditions
An allocation ((xi), (f i)) in
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i ×∏∞t=0∏i∈It RL+ is feasible if:
∑
i∈It−1
xit,h =
∑
i∈It
f it,h, for t ≥ 1, for h durable ,
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(xit−1) +
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(f it−1), for t > 1,
and
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
ei1
The first equation indicates that there are no wastes, all the durable goods owned by
old agents at the end of their lifetime will be bought by the young agents at that time.
We denote by A(E) the set of all feasible allocations.
Equilibrium
Definition 3.2.1. An equilibrium of the economy (E) is a list (p∗,Π∗, (xi∗), (f i∗)) in∏∞
t=1RL+ ×
∏∞
t=1RL+ ×
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i ×∏∞t=0∏i∈It RL+ such that:
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a) for all t ≥ 1, for all i ∈ It, (xi∗, f i∗) is a maximal element of ui satisfying the budget
constraint:
p∗t ·xit+p∗t+1 ·xit+1 +Π∗t ·f it ≤ p∗t ·eit+p∗t+1 ·eit+1 +p∗t+1 ·Γt(xit)+p∗t+1 ·Γt(f it )+Π∗t+1 ·xit+1,
for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui satisfying: p∗1 · xi1 ≤ p∗1 · ei1 + Π∗1 · xi1.
b) the allocation ((xi∗), (f i∗)) is feasible:
∑
i∈It−1
xi∗t =
∑
i∈It
f i∗t , for t ≥ 1,
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xi∗t =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(xi∗t−1) +
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(f i∗t−1), for t > 1,
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi∗1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
ei1.
Remark 3.2.1. The first equation in Condition b) implies:
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xi∗t =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
Γt−1(xi∗t−1), for t > 1
This equation states that the consumptions at date t involve consumptions of the pre-
ceeding generations.
In the following, we denote by γt the transpose of Γt.
Proposition 3.2.1. i) If (p∗,Π∗) is an equilibrium price, then (p∗, Πˆ∗) where
Πˆ∗t := γt(p∗t+1) for all t, is also an equilibrium.
ii) For all t ∈ N∗, p∗t  γt(p∗t+1).
Remark 3.2.2. i) The equilibrium price (p∗, Πˆ∗) coincides with the equilibrium defined
by Malinvaud in [44], where he considered an intertemporal economy with perish-
able commodities. These commodities do not cross time but may be available to
agents only in future dates; in this case, agents are allowed to trade on forward
markets at forward prices. Our model is then similar to the model a` la Malinvaud
with a production with constant returns.
ii) Furthermore, if we think xi∗t as a bundle that gives right to consumption at date t
as well as “input” for date t+ 1, we may write p∗t = γt(p∗t+1) + p′t, where γt(p∗t+1)
can be seen as the “input” cost while p′t is the consumption cost at date t.
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Proof. At equilibrium, Π∗t+1 ≥ γt+1(p∗t+2), for all t. Otherwise, all the young agents at
date t + 1 will have an arbitrage opportunity by buying a commodity h on the futures
market and reselling it on the spot market at date t + 2. Then, there is no solution to
the utility maximization problem under the budget constraint since the utility functions
are locally nonsatiated.
Furthermore, if Π∗t+1,h > (γ
t+1(pt+2))h, the young agents have no incentive to buy on the
futures market because it is better to wait until the next period to make the purchase
on the spot market, so f i∗t+1,h = 0 for all i. But this implies that x
i∗
t+1,h = 0 for all i.
If we decrease the future price from Π∗t+1,h to Πˆ
∗
t+1,h, then the budget set B
i(p∗, Πˆ∗)
associated to (p∗, Πˆ∗) is smaller and included in the budget set Bi(p∗,Π∗) associated
to (p∗,Π∗). Moreover, ((xi∗), (f i∗)) belongs to Bi(p∗, Πˆ∗). Hence as it is optimal in
B(p∗,Π∗), it is still optimal in the smaller set Bi(p∗,Π∗). So (p∗, Πˆ∗) is an equilibrium
price with the same consumption allocations.
Now, let us suppose that there exists a durable commodity h in L such that p∗th ≤
(γt(p∗t+1))h. Thus, either p∗th < (γ
t(p∗t+1))h or p∗th = (γ
t(p∗t+1))h If the first case holds,
then young agents at date t, will have an arbitrage opportunity by buying the commodity
h at price p∗th on the spot market, and reselling it at the price (γ
t(p∗t+1))h at date t+ 1.
In the second case, the agent would be willing to buy as much as she wants of good
h when she is young, since her utility is locally nonsatiated, thus there would be no
solution to the utility maximization problem. So necessarely, arbitrage-free condition
implies p∗t  γt(p∗t+1), for all t ∈ N∗.

Thus the list (p∗, (xi∗), (f i∗)) in
∏∞
t=1RL+ ×
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i ×∏∞t=0∏i∈It RL+ such that:
a) for all t ≥ 1, for all i ∈ It, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xi | (p∗t − γt(p∗t+1)) · xit + (p∗t+1 − γt+1(p∗t+2)) · xit+1 ≤ p∗t · eit + p∗t+1 · eit+1},
for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xi | (p∗1 − γ1(p∗2)) · xi1 ≤ p∗1 · ei1}.
b) the allocations ((xi∗), (f i∗)) are feasible:
∑
i∈It−1
xi∗t =
∑
i∈It
f i∗t , for t ≥ 1,
∑
i∈It−1∪It
x∗it =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
Γt−1(xi∗t−1), for t > 1,
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∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi∗1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
ei1.
is an equilibrium with durable goods.
The budget constraint in a) indicates that the agents anticipate the future prices. Indeed
the price vector p∗t+2 appears in the budget constraint of the agents of generation t
because of the trade they make when old with the young of generation t + 1 whose
budget constraint involves prices at date t + 2: at equilibrium these agents anticipate
Πt+1 to be equal to γ
t+1pt+2.
Moreover, we note an indetermination for the (f i∗) given in b). As a matter of fact, the
individuals maximize their utility under a budget constraint that does not depend on
the f i∗ anymore. The f i∗’s are only given by
∑
i∈It−1 x
i∗
t =
∑
i∈It f
i∗
t , for t ≥ 1, which
means that the agents are indifferent between buying today on the futures market or
buying tomorrow on the spot market. This is an usual direct consequence of the no-
arbitrage condition on spot and futures prices.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium with durable goods, we will focus on the so-
called “reduced equilibrium”defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.2. A “reduced equilibrium”is a list (p∗, (xi∗)) of
∏∞
t=1RL+×
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i
such that:
a) for all t ≥ 1, for all i ∈ It, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xi | (p∗t − γt(p∗t+1)) · xit + (p∗t+1 − γt+1(p∗t+2)) · xit+1 ≤ p∗t · eit + p∗t+1 · eit+1},
for all i ∈ I0, xi∗ is a maximal element of ui in the budget set:
{xi ∈ Xi | (p∗1 − γ1(p∗2)) · xi1 ≤ p∗1 · ei1}.
b) the allocations ((xi∗)) are feasible:
∑
i∈It−1∪It
x∗it =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit +
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
Γt−1(xi∗t−1), for t > 1,
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi∗1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
ei1.
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Indeed, if (p∗, (xi∗)) is a reduced equilibrium, then the list (p∗,Π∗, (xi∗), (f i∗)) where
Π∗t := γt(p∗t+1) for all t, and the f i∗’s are such that
∑
i∈It−1 x
i∗
t =
∑
i∈It f
i∗
t , for t ≥ 1,
is an equilibrium.
Our main result is the following existence theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. Under Assumptions C and E, the economy E has an equilibrium.
3.3 An equivalent economy without durable goods
In the following, since the budget constraint of each individual involves prices over three
periods of time, we build an equivalent economy E˜ “without” durable goods, where each
individual’s lifetime is extended over three periods. This equivalent economy is similar
to the standard pure exchange OLG model with perishable goods, and we will establish
the existence of an equilibrium in E˜ to prove the existence of an equilibrium in an econ-
omy with durable goods.
3.3.1 Description of the equivalent economy E˜
We consider an overlapping generations model with discrete and infinitely many dates
t = 1, 2 . . ., and the same commodity space L at each date.
At each date t, the set of consumers, called generation t is the same, and denoted by It.
To describe the characteristics of the consumers we define the following linear mappings:
φt : (RL)2 → (RL)3, for t ≥ 1, by φt(xit, xit+1) = (xit, ξit+1, ζit+2), with
ξit+1 = x
i
t+1 − Γt(xit), and ζit+2 = −Γt+1(ξit+1 + Γt(xit)),
φ0 : RL → (RL)2, by φ0(xi1) = (ξi1, ζi2), with ξi1 = xi1, and ζi2 = −Γ1(ξi1).
The consumption sets are now defined as follows:
For each i ∈ I0, X˜i := φ0(RL+), and for each i ∈ It, t ≥ 1, X˜i := φt((RL+)2).
Thus the consumption set of an agent i of generation t, X˜i is defined over three periods:
t, t+1 and t+2, and that of generation 0 is now defined over two periods: t = 1 and t = 2.
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The initial endowment is defined as follows:
e˜i = (ei1, 0) ∈ RL++ ×RL, for i ∈ I1, and e˜i = (eit, eit+1, 0) ∈ RL++ ×RL++ ×RL, for i ∈ It.
For each t, the function φt is injective, the function φt|(RL+)2
: (RL+)2 → X˜i is bijec-
tive. Its inverse ψt : X˜i → (RL+)2 is thus well defined. In the same way, the function
φ0|RL+
: RL+ → X˜i is bijective, and its inverse ψ0 : X˜i → RL+ is thus also well defined.
We can now define the new utility functions u˜i : X˜i → R, by u˜i = ui ◦ ψt.
Note that for each i ∈ I0, u˜i(ξi1, ζi2) = ui(ξi1), and for each i ∈ It, t ≥ 1, u˜i(xit, ξit+1, ζit+2) =
ui(xit, ξ
i
t+1 + Γ
t(xit)).
This new utility function clearly shows the role of any purchase of durable goods by
young agents on their consumption when old. Re-defining consumption bundles in this
way supposes an “internalisation”of the durability technology in the utility.
The definition below coincides with the standard definition of a competitive equilibrium
in an OLG economy without durable goods.
Definition 3.3.1. An equilibrium in E˜ is a list (p∗, (χi∗)) in ∏∞t=1RL+ ×∏∞t=0∏i∈It X˜i,
such that:
a) for all t ∈ N, for all i ∈ It, χi∗ = (xi∗t , ξi∗t+1, ζi∗t+2) is a maximal element of u˜i satisfying
the equivalent budget constraint:
p∗t · xi∗t + p∗t+1 · ξi∗t+1 + p∗t+2 · ζi∗t+2 ≤ p∗t · e˜it + p∗t+1 · e˜it+1
b) the consumption plan (χi∗) is feasible:∑
i∈I0 ξ
i∗
1 +
∑
i∈I1 x
i∗
1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1 e˜
i
1∑
i∈It−2 ζ
i∗
t +
∑
i∈It−1 ξ
i∗
t +
∑
i∈It x
i∗
t =
∑
i∈It−1∪It e˜
i
t, t > 1
Proposition 3.3.1. If (p∗, (χi∗)), where χi∗ = (xi∗t , ξi∗t+1, ζi∗t+2) for i ∈ It is an equilibrium of
the equivalent economy, then (p∗, (xi∗)) is a reduced equilibrium, where xi∗ = (xi∗t , ξi∗t+1+
Γ(xi∗t )) for i ∈ It, t ≥ 1.
Proof. Indeed, by construction, if (χi∗) is feasible in E˜ , then, ((xi∗)) defined by xi∗ =
(xi∗t , ξi∗t+1 + Γ(xi∗t )) is feasible, that is:∑
i∈I0
ξi∗1 +
∑
i∈I1
xi
∗
1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi
∗
1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1
e˜i1
∑
i∈It−2
ζi∗t +
∑
i∈It−1
ξi∗t +
∑
i∈It
xi∗t =
∑
i∈It−2
−Γt−1(xi∗t−1) +
∑
i∈It−1
(xi∗t − Γt−1(xi∗t−1)) +
∑
i∈It
xi∗t
OLG models with Durable Goods 52
Thus: ∑
i∈It−1∪It
x∗it =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
e˜it +
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
Γt−1(xi∗t−1), for t > 1
Furthermore the optimality of χi∗ for the utility function u˜i under the equivalent budget
constraint above implies, by construction, the optimality of xi∗ = (xi∗t , ξi∗t+1 + Γ(xi∗t )) for
the utility function ui and under the budget constraint:
p∗t · xit + p∗t+1 · (xit+1 − Γt(xit))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξit+1
+p∗t+2 · (−Γt+1(xit+1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζit+2
≤ p∗t · eit + p∗t+1 · eit+1
p∗1 · xi1︸︷︷︸
ξi1
+p∗2 · (−Γ1(xi1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζi2
≤ p∗1 · xi1, i ∈ I0.

3.3.2 Some properties of the equivalent economy
• For all t = 1, 2, . . ., for all i ∈ It, the consumption sets X˜i are non-empty, closed,
and convex.
We note that the X˜i’s are not the positive orthants, but the consumptions at date t
for i ∈ It are bounded from below. Indeed, for each individual i of generation t, we
allow for negative consumptions at dates t+ 1 and t+ 2, but the consumptions at
date t+ 1 and t+ 2 are constrained by the consumptions at the preceeding dates.
These kind of consumption sets are considered by Florenzano in [30], in which
nonnegative components are called consumptions and nonpositive ones deliveries:
the activity of an agent of generation t at date t+1 artificially consists of delivering
the remaining goods she holds at this period to agents of the next genaration.
• For all t = 1, 2, . . ., for all i ∈ It, the utility functions u˜i defined above inherit
the conditions on ui in Assumption C, thanks to the linearity of φt and ψt. In
particular, there exists i0(t) in It such that u˜i0 is strictly monotonic with respect
to the two first variables (xi0t , ξ
i0
t+1).
• The set of feasible allocations A(E˜), that is the set of allocations satisfying the
market clearing condition (Condition (b) of Definition 3.3.1) for the economy E˜ is
a subset of a compact set for the product topology. Indeed, let e ∈ ∏t∈N∗ RL+ be
defined by et =
∑
i∈It∪It−1 e
i
t. Let e
′ ∈ ∏t∈N∗ RL+ such that e′ ≥ e. Then, there
exists a sequence of nonnegative vectors (Mt)t≥1 such that for all (χi) ∈ A(E˜),
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with χi = (xit, ξ
i
t+1, ζ
i
t+2), i ∈ It, for all t = 1, 2 . . ., we have:
0 ≤ xit ≤Mt, −Γt(Mt) ≤ ξit+1 ≤Mt+1, and −Γt+1(Mt+1) ≤ ζit+2 ≤ 0.
Mt is recursively defined by: Mt = e
′
t + Γ
t−1(Mt−1 + Γt−2(Mt−2) · · · + Γ1(M1)),
where M1 = e
′
1. (See Appendix A)
3.4 Existence of equilibrium in the equivalent economy
To establish the existence of equilibrium in E˜ , we first truncate the economy E˜ at a finite
horizon τ and consider the set of all individuals born up to period τ −2, Iτ−20 = ∪τ−2t=0 It.
For each i ∈ I0,
X˜τi = {a ∈ (RL+)τ | (a1, a2) ∈ X˜i, at′ = 0, ∀t′ > 2}
u˜τi(a) = u˜i(a1, a2)
e˜τi = (e˜τit′ )
τ
t′=1 such that e˜
τi
1 = e˜
i
1, and e˜
τi
t′ = 0 if t
′ > 1.
For each i ∈ It, t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 3,
X˜τi = {a ∈ (RL+)τ | (at, at+1, at+2) ∈ X˜i, at′ = 0,∀t′ 6= t, t+ 1, t+ 2}
For each i ∈ Iτ−2,
X˜τi = {a ∈ (RL+)τ | (aτ−2, aτ−1,−Γτ−1(aτ−1 + Γτ−2(aτ−2)) ∈ X˜i,
at′ = 0,∀t′ 6= τ − 1, τ − 2}
u˜τi(a) = u˜i(at, at+1, at+2)
e˜τi = (e˜τit′ )
τ
t′=1 such that e˜
τi
t = e˜
i
t, e˜
τi
t+1 = e˜
i
t+1 and e˜
τi
t′ = 0 if t
′ 6= t, t+ 1.
We note that the standard survival assumption is not satisfied because the initial endow-
ment e˜τi may not belong to the consumption set X˜τi. Indeed, for i ∈ It, (e˜it, e˜it+1, e˜it+2)
may not be in X˜i since e˜it+2 = 0 6= −Γt+1(e˜it+1 + Γt(e˜it)) if Γt+1 6= 0. So in order to
overcome this difficulty, we work with a free-disposal equilibrium by introducing the
free-disposal cone Y := −(RL+)τ . Then e˜τi ∈ X˜τi−Y . See [28] and [29] for the existence
of free-disposal equilibrium in a pure exchange economy.
Now, we introduce a weak notion of equilibrium, called pseudo-equilibrium, in which
we do not require the market clearing condition at periods τ − 1 and τ . Indeed, the
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truncation of an equilibrium is not an equilibrium but a pseudo-equilibrium. (See Lemma
3.1 below).
Definition 3.4.1. A pseudo-equilibrium in the truncated economy E˜τ is an element
(p∗, (ai∗) ∈ (RL+)τ ×
∏
i∈Iτ−20 X
τi such that:
a) for all t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 2, for all i ∈ It, ai∗ is a maximal element of u˜τi in the budget
set
{ai ∈ X˜τi | p∗ · ai ≤ p∗ · e˜τi};
for all i ∈ I0, ai∗ is a maximal element of u˜τi in the budget set {ai ∈ X˜τi | p∗·ai ≤ p∗·e˜τi};
b) For all t = 1, . . . , τ − 2, ∑
i∈Iτ−20
ai∗t =
∑
i∈Iτ−20
e˜τit ,
∑
i∈Iτ−20
ai∗τ−1 ≤
∑
i∈Iτ−20
e˜τiτ−1 +
∑
i∈Iτ−1
e˜iτ−1.
According to this definition, at period τ−1, we artificially increase the initial endowments
by adding those of the consumers of the generation τ − 1.
Lemma 3.1. If τ¯ > τ and (p¯∗, (a¯i∗)) is a pseudo-equilibrium in the economy Eτ¯ , then
the price and the allocations restricted to the τ − 1 first periods
(
pˆ∗, (aˆi∗)i∈Iτ−20
)
defined
by
pˆ∗ = (p¯∗t )
τ−1
t=1 ,
aˆi∗ = (a¯i∗t )
τ−1
t=1 , for all i ∈ Iτ−20 , is a pseudo-equilibrium in the economy Eτ .
In the following, we will establish the existence of a pseudo-equilibrium in E˜τ . For that,
we use the fact that an equilibrium with free-disposal is a pseudo-equilibrium. But since
e˜τi ∈ X˜τi − Y , the problem of non-interiority of the initial endowments leads us to first
make use of the notion of quasi-equilibrium with free-disposal as an intermediate step.
Definition 3.4.2. A quasi-equilibrium with free-disposal in E˜τ is a list (p∗, (ai∗), y∗) in
(RL+)τ ×
∏
i∈Iτ−20 X
τi × Y such that:
a’) for all t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 1, ai∗ is an element of the budget set:
{ai ∈ X˜τi | p∗ · ai ≤ p∗ · e˜τi}
and for all ai ∈ X˜τi such that: p∗ · ai < p∗ · e˜τi, u˜τi(ai) ≤ u˜τi(ai∗),
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for all i ∈ I0, ai∗ ∈ {ai ∈ X˜i | p∗ · ai ≤ p∗ · e˜τi} and for all ai ∈ X˜τi such that
p∗ · ai < p∗ · e˜τi, u˜τi(xi) ≤ u˜τi(xi∗),
b) p∗ · y ≤ p∗ · y∗ = 0 for all y ∈ Y
c)
∑
i∈Iτ−20 a
i∗ =
∑
i∈Iτ−20 e˜
τi + y∗
d) p∗ 6= 0.
Proposition 3.4.1. For all τ ≥ 3, E˜τ has a quasi-equilibrium with free-disposal (p∗, (ai∗), (y∗))
in (RL+)τ ×
∏
i∈Iτ−20 X
τi × Y .
Proof
Indeed, E˜τ satisfies all the necessary conditions of existence of quasi-equilibrium in an
exchange economy where free-disposal activities are possible. [See Florenzano in [29],
Proposition 2.2.2]
• e˜τi ∈ X˜τi − Y and ∑i∈Iτ−20 e˜τi ∈ int(∑i∈Iτ−20 X˜τi − Y )
• for all i, u˜τi satisfies the classical conditions of continuity, quasi-concavity and
local non-satiation,
• the set of feasible allocations A(E˜τ ) is a subset of a compact set of (RL)τ . 
Actually, one way to go from a quasi-equilibrium to an equilibrium is the notion of
McKenzie-Debreu irreducibility. But following Assumption C and Assumption D made
on the original economy, we establish that the truncated economy E˜τ is McKenzie-Debreu
irreducible.
Proposition 3.4.2. The truncated economy E˜τ , equiped with the disposal activity Y is
McKenzie-Debreu irreducible, that is for all non-empty disjoint subsets J1, J2 of Iτ−20 ,
J1, J2 6= Iτ−20 , Iτ−20 = J1 unionsq J2,and for all feasible allocation (ai) ∈
∏
i∈Iτ−20 X
τi, there
exists an allocation (a′i) ∈∏i∈Iτ−20 Xτi such that:
1- u˜τi(a′i) ≥ u˜τi(ai) for all i ∈ J1 and ∃j ∈ J1, u˜τj(a′j) > u˜τj(aj),
2-
∑
i∈Iτ−20 (a
′i − e˜τi)−∑i∈J2(e˜τi − ai) ∈ Y
Taking into account the feasibility of the allocation (ai), condition 2 can also be written
as:
∑
i∈Iτ−20 a
′i −∑i∈J1 ai +∑i∈J2 e˜τi ∈ Y .
The irreducibility condition says that whenever the individuals are allocated into two
nonempty and disjoint groups J1 and J2, then for any feasible allocation (a
i) and after
disposing of any eventual surplus,
∑
i∈Iτ−20 e˜
τi +
∑
i∈J2(e˜
τi − xi) can be allocated to
group J1 improving the situation of its members as given by Relation 1.
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Proof.
First case, there exists t such that It ∩ J1 6= ∅, and It ∩ J2 6= ∅. So let i1 and i2 be in It
such that i1 6= i2 and i1 ∈ J1, i2 ∈ J2. Since e˜τit and e˜τit+1 are positive for i = i1, i2, each
one is able to provide some good for which the other one is willing to exchange with some
good of its own thanks to Assumption C. For instance, take a′i1 = ai1 +  where  > 0 is
arbitrarely small, a′i2 = e˜τi2 −  0 for  small enough, a′i = ai, for i ∈ J1, i 6= i1, and
a′i = e˜τi, for i ∈ J2, i 6= i2. Clearly, a′i satisfies Relations 1 and 2: the situation of one
group will be moved to a preferred position, by adding a feasible trade from the other
group.
Suppose now that there does not exist t such that It ∩ J1 6= ∅ and It ∩ J2 6= ∅; let us
define: t¯1 := max{t | It ⊂ J1}, t¯2 := max{t | It ⊂ J2}.
Note that the sets {t | It ⊂ J1} and {t | It ⊂ J2} are disjoint and thei union is
{1, 2, . . . τ − 2}.
If t¯1 6= τ −2, then It¯1 ⊂ J1 and It¯1+1 ⊂ J2. If t¯1 = τ −2, then since t¯2 6= τ −2, It¯2 ⊂ J2
and It¯2+1 ⊂ J1. Since the two sub-cases can be treated similarly, we deal only with the
first one, in which It¯1 ⊂ J1 and It¯1+1 ⊂ J2. In this sub-case, since e˜τit¯1 , e˜τit¯1+1 are positive
for i ∈ It¯1 , as well as e˜τit¯1+1 for i ∈ It¯1+1, both generations are able to provide some
commodity during their common period of life. In particular, consider the individual
i0(t¯1) mentionned in Assumption C, then a young individual i of generation t¯1 + 1 can
provide some goods to i0(t¯1), improving the utility of i0(t¯1) when he is old at date t¯1 + 1.
If we keep the allocations of the other individuals of J1 unchanged, and let the other
members of J2 consume their initial endowments, Relations 1 and 2 are satisfied. 
Thanks to Assumptions C and D on the original economy, the McKenzie-Debreu irre-
ducibility of the truncated economy E˜τ and the interiority of the total initial endowment,
we get that a quasi-equilibrium with free-disposal (p∗, (ai∗)) ∈∏τt=1RL+×∏i∈Iτ−20 Xτi is
an equlibrium with free-disposal. (See Florenzano [29], Proposition 2.3.2 and Corollary
2.3.2)
Remark 3.4.1. The strict monotonicity of the utility function ui0 of an individual i0 in
It in Assumption C implies that p∗t  0 for all t = 1, 2, . . . τ − 1, thus y∗t = 0 for all
t = 1, 2, . . . τ − 1.
Thus, since the equilibrium is realized without disposal of surplus, we get that the
equilibrium with free-disposal is actually an equilibrium so a pseudo-equilibrium. Hence,
one finally obtains:
Proposition 3.4.3. For all τ ≥ 3, there exists a pseudo-equilibrium of the economy E˜τ .
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The following lemma gives properties of the pseudo-equilibrium. We normalize a non
zero equilibrium price p∗ so that
∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈L p
∗
t` = 1.
Lemma 3.2. If (p∗, (ai∗)) ∈ (RL+)τ ×
∏
i∈Iτ−0 X
τi is a pseudo-equilibrium, then p∗t  0,
for all t.
Furthermore, the set of pseudo-equilibria of the economy E˜τ with a normalized price is
closed.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The last step of the existence of equilibrium in the reduced economy consists of consider-
ing a sequence of pseudo-equilibria in the truncated economy with an horizon increasing
to infinity. We follow [13], and establish that the sequence of equilibrium prices in the
truncated economies remains in a compact set for the product topology on
∏∞
t=1RL.
From the previous section, for all T ≥ 2, there exists a pseudo-equilibrium (pT , (aiT )) of
the economy E˜T . Since we have previously proved that pT1 6= 0, we normalize pT so that∑
`∈L p
T
1` = 1.
We extend the price and the allocations to the whole space
∏∞
t=1RL by adding zeros for
the missing components without modifying the notations. So, now the sequences (pT ),
(aiT ) are in
∏∞
t=1RL.
Lemma 3.3. For all t, there exists k˜t ∈ R+ such that for all T , 0 ≤ pTt ≤ k˜t1, where
1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RL.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now we show that the sequence of pseudo-equilibria remains in a compact set and we
prove that a cluster point is an equilibrium of the OLG economy E .
From the compactness of A(E˜) and the above lemma, the sequence of T -equilibrium
of the economy ET , (pT , (aiT )), remains in a compact set for the product topology of∏∞
t=1RL×
∏∞
t′=1
∏
i∈It′
∏∞
t=1RL. Since this is a countable product of finite dimensional
spaces, the product topology is metrizable on the compact sets and there exists a sub-
sequence (pT
ν
, (aiT
ν
)) of (pT , (aiT )), which converges to (p∗, (ai∗)). We recall that the
convergence for the product topology implies the usual convergence when we consider
only a finite number of components.
For each τ ≥ 3, for ν large enough, the restriction of (pT ν , (aiT ν )) to the τ first periods is a
pseudo-equilibrium of E˜τ (see Lemma 3.1) and it converges to the restriction of (p∗, (ai∗))
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to the τ first periods. From Lemma 3.2, this restriction is a pseudo-equilibrium of E˜τ .
From Definition 3.4.1 and the notations above, one deduces that (p∗, (αi∗)) defined as
follows is an equilibrium for the OLG economy E˜ :
αi∗ = (xi∗t , ξi∗t+1, ζi∗t+1), for all t ≥ 1 and for all i ∈ It,
αi∗ = (ξi∗1 , ζi∗2 ), for all i ∈ I0.

3.5 Concluding Remarks, Discussions and Possible exten-
sions
To summarize, we have established an existence result that relies on another important
result such as the fact that a pure exchange economy with durable goods is equivalent to
a standard pure exchange economy “without” durable goods. This equivalent economy
helps to confirm that a consumption of durable goods by young agents has an impact,
both on their consumption when old, but also after their lifetime, this explains the
extension from a two-period lifetime into three-period one. This equivalent economy
satisfies classical assumptions of a standard pure exchange economy, except the survival
assumption. In order to recover this difficulty, we introduce an artificial free-disposal
cone, a classical technical solution, provided by Florenzano in [28–30]. The ultimate step
from an equilibrium with free disposal into an equilibrium is ensured by the desirablility
of durable goods, which confirms why this assumption is primordial in our model.
However, above the existence results of equilibria, this paper provides a mechanism
within which generations successively transfer their wealth, by means of durable goods,
and shows that their consumptions, thanks to their durability, entail their owners a
role of producer. It is clear that the consumption behaviour has impacts not only on
their close future or their own generation but also on the succeeding generations. The
irreducibility property that links generations to each other appears then natural to our
economy, and this feature was important to our existence result. In the following, we
will see more in detail the role of the durable goods in our model.
Durable goods act like consumption goods and inputs for future dates, so they not only
enter the budget constraints but are involved in the utility function of each agent as
well, contrary to many existing literatures. Many other models consider durables not
as consumption goods but as goods which bring services, and it is theses services that
are involved in the utility of agents. In our model, according to the relations on prices,
durable goods can be “consumed” and differ from perishable goods in the sense that
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their prices contain an additionnal component which measures their ability to be used
as inputs or any other investment goods for the future. Therefore, any agent who holds
a durable good acts like a consumer and a producer at the same time, in this line, we
can think of the linear mapping Γt as a production technology to which each consumer
can have access in order to store or transfer the good accross successive periods. This
production takes time: from a consumption at period t is produced a good, available at
date t+ 1 that will add to the existing allocations.
Financial markets and Arbitrage-free condition
It is important that durable goods must be desired, by at least one individual of each
generation, and no wastes are allowed. Since the future is assumed perfectly antipated,
old agents will never purchase any durable goods unless they are sure that they can sell
them again on the futures market. Whenever a durable good still remain at the end
of the life of its owner, it will be traded on the futures market. At equilibrium, under
the no-wastes condition and given the perfect foresight, consumptions of old agents may
include durable goods, which will bring an additionnal financial resource thanks to the
futures market, this relates the notion of viager if we associate the durable good to
housing: agents can enjoy of their house during their old ages while receiving the future
market value of that house. The budget initial constraint of agent i ∈ It illustrates it
by showing the consumption xit+1 at both the expenditure and the income sides.
As mentionned before, the trade of deliverable goods in the future can be associated
to borrowings and lendings, that are balanced at each date according to the market
clearing condition. More precisely, at each date t, consider the individual i ∈ It and
denote by lit := Πt · f it the amount that he spends on the futures market when young.
Note that lit can be seen as saving when young that may be borrowed by old of previous
generation, and will bring (1 + rt)l
i
t at date t + 1, where rt is the rate of return. Note
also that agent i is allowed to borrow bit+1 when old from the young of next generation
but up to b¯it+1 := Πt+1 · xit+1, that is, the durable good he holds when old, xit+1 will
serve as collateral to his lending. Then, the budget constraint of agent i writes as:
pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 + lit ≤ pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 + pt+1 · Γt(xit) + (1 + rt)lit + bit+1
At equilibrium, thanks to the arbitrage-free condition (1 + rt)l
i = (1 + rt)Πt · f it =
γt(pt+1) · f it , this budget constraint is the same as the initial one introduced previously
in our model. In addition, the no-wastes condition:
∑
i∈It f
i
t =
∑
i∈It−1 x
i
t implies that∑
i∈It b
i
t =
∑
i∈It b¯
i
t =
∑
i∈It−1 l
i
t, this confirms that all borrowings are paid back, all
collaterals are seized.
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Moreover, from the arbitrage-free condition ((1+rt)Πt−γt(pt+1)) ·f it = 0, we know that
if rt ≤ 0, then Πt ≥ γt(pt+1), a necessary condition at equilibrium as remarked in the
proof of Proposition 3.2.1. But the case where rt < 0 would lead to a lack of incentive
to save or lend to the old, leaving the remaining durable goods valueless. By considering
rt = 0, we have the so called reduced equilibrium where Πt = γ
t(pt+1), which confirms
that at equilibrium the (f i)’s will be completely indeterminate. As a remark on the
shares on firms θij ’s in the previous chapter, this indetermination is again an immediate
consequence of the non-arbitrage condition. Here in our framework, it stipulates that
young agents are indifferent between buying today on the futures market or waiting the
next period to buy on the spot market. The only condition on the f i’s is the market
clearing condition that prevents wastes and defaults in case of lending.
One important fact from our model is its structure which allows the agents to buy or hold
an asset at the end of their lifetime, for instance, many agents buy a house at their old
age. But the condition of no-arbitrage resulting in an indetermination of the f i’s limits
our result, a priori, the indifference of agents between trading with the old in futures
market or waiting to buy in the spot market cannot ensure that the transfer actually
happens, thus the f i can eventually be zero. Another way to recover this limitation is the
altruism, which will ensure that agents have incentive to hold durable goods and transfer
them to the next generation, even if it does not bring them any financial compensation.
Bequest motives:
It might happen that old agents leave freely their remaining durable goods to the next
generation as a bequest. In such a situation, supposing altruism implies that their utility
may be affected by the utility of their heir who benefits from the bequests. Indeed, we
then have a particular case of Seghir and Martinez [56], where we first suppose that
lifetimes are not uncertain. Our model can be adapted in the following way. For each
t and each i ∈ It, the bequest he intendes to leave to the next generation is denoted
by Bi =
∑
k∈It+1 B
i
k. Then we introduce a function V
i : RL+ → R+ as the utility that
agent i ∈ It gets from his bequest motives. This bequest consists of some part of the
remaining durable goods xit+1 that the old agents decide to put on their will at date t+1
so that some individuals of generation t + 1 will have the rights over them. The other
part, ξit+1 will be traded on the future market at price Πt+1 as described in our original
model. Note that whether it concerns trade on futures market or bequest, the delivery
will take place at date t + 2 when the agent disappears from the economy. We do not
require that the agents know from whom they benefit of the transfer, so they receive it
in an anonymous way, and we call T i the total nominal transfer that agent i receives.
This transfer will consist of the bequest they inherit from the previous generation t− 1,
registered at date t, delivered at date t+ 1 thus valued at the price pt+1. Thus, on one
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side, old agents leave bequests to the next generation and on the other side, they also
receive some transfer from the old of the previous generation.
The budget constraint of agent i ∈ It becomes:
pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 + Πtf it ≤ pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1 + pt+1 · Γt(xit) + Πt+1 · ξit+1 + T i
Thus, if we consider again the same model with the borrowing and lending system,
the collateral to back up his borrowing will consist of the remaining durable goods
net of the bequest, or equivalently, the bequest cannnot exceed the wealth of agent i
net of his debt from borrowing. More precisely, we have that xit+1 = ξ
i
t+1 + B
i, and∑
i∈It ξ
i
t+1 =
∑
i∈It+1 f
i
t+1.
At each period t, we can write the no-wastes condition as:
∑
i∈It−1
xit =
∑
i∈It
f it +
∑
i∈It−1
Bi,
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit+
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(xit−1)+
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(f it−1)+
∑
i∈It−1
Γt−1(Bi), for t > 1,
and
∑
i∈I0∪I1 x
i
1 =
∑
i∈I0∪I1 e
i
1.
Finally, an equilibrium would then consist of (p, (T i), (xi), (f i), (Bi)) such that:
a) (xi, f i, Bi) maximizes the utility function U i(xi, Bi) := ui(xi) +V i(Bi) satisfying the
budget constraint above;
b) There are no wastes and the market clears at each date t.
c) T i =
∑
k∈It−1 pt+1 · Γt(Bki ).
Here, agents are supposed to receive their bequest only after they reimburse their debt.
The difference with our initial model is that, old agents now have a lower level of col-
lateral to access to a lending, but he can enjoy of an additionnal wealth through the
anonymous transfer from the previous generation, which is not necessarely as high as the
value of his whole remaining durable if he would have traded it on the future market.
But here, introducing the bequest motive enhances the possibility of transfer accross
generations, where the incentive is not necessarely related to the financial issue but to
the utility of each agent that is increasing with the bequest he concedes. The concerns
of the agents on the next generations well-being can explain then why they still hold
assets or buy durable goods at the end of their lifetime.
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In our framework, conditions of no-arbitrage on prices at equilibrium are required in-
ducing the indetermination of the f is and possibility of a null rate of return. Although
this transfer mechanism appears to be financially neutral or non-motivating, this is not
the case for he economy since it helps to improve the situation of old agents and of all
the successive generations. This can explain the role of institutions that make sure that
some allocations will be always left to the old and to the future generations to promote
their welfare.
Durable goods and uncertainty
Introducing uncertainty to our model is relevant extension. For instance, associating
durable goods to collateral loans in the literature supposes that agents are exposed to
default risk by lending, since the borrowers, for some reason may fail to pay them back.
The existence of durable goods eases the extension of our model to a framework where
agents finitely live at least for two consecutive periods, and have a robability to die in the
next period, at each period. Indeed, whenever an agent disappears from the economy,
then either he has paid his debt back or the lender seizes his durable good that serves as
collateral at its current price after incuring the transformation Γt. Such a model already
exists, we can for instance follow again Seghir and Martinez [56] and adapt it to our
OLG model.
We consider the same discrete and infinitely many dates t = 0, 1, . . .. The demographic
structure consists of a finite group of agents born at each date t, It, and lives for at least
two dates, ensuring individuals of different lifetimes to overlap. Consider i ∈ It. He
is initially endowed of some allocations (eit+k)k≥0 and consumes (x
i
t+k)k≥0 for k finite.
eit+k = 0 if agent i lives from t to t+k−1 where k ≥ 2. His utility function is accordingly
extended. Each consumption xit+k will bring Γ
t+k(xit+k) at date t + k + 1 and can be
proposed to be sold on the future market or proposed as collateral for a loan contracted
at any t+ k. All agents alive at this period can take part to this trade, and agent i can
also take part to the future contracts issued by his contemporanous.
Call Gs the set of all agents alive at date s, then, the market clearing condtition at date
s is given by:
∑
i∈Gs
xis =
∑
i∈Gs
f is, for s ≥ 1,
∑
i∈Gs
xis =
∑
i∈Gs
eis +
∑
i∈Gs−1
Γs−1(xis−1) +
∑
i∈Gs−1
Γs−1(f is−1), for s > 1,
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Consequently, the uncertainty on the duration of lifetime enables agents to trade with
all their contemporanous, at any period they are alive, but at each date, all of the
borrowing and lending activities will be balanced so that there is no room for default
even when a borrower accidently disappears from the economy.
Durable goods, liquid and illiquid wealth
Although our focus is different, it is worth pointing out that the absence of risk or un-
certainty limits the roles of durable goods and ignores some issues related to them. This
can be seen in the literature that considers durable goods as consumptions and assets,
and treats for instance wealth distribution, illiquidity, income risks and precautionary
savings. It is not specified in our model, but in the literature, the illiquidity level of
durable goods is of significant importance in determining the saving, and can explain
also the consumption or expenditure of agents. The illiquidity supposes that, if agents
are facing financial issues, in order to sell their durable goods or borrow againt them,
they may incur losses. This may then interfere in the demand of durable goods and
limit their purchase, as confirmed by Mishkin [47]. This issue is clearly ignored in our
model, even if we also link the existence of durable good to savings and to collateral for
loans. Indeed, we consider durable goods desirable, thus agents are willing to buy or
hold them, their transactions are easy and costless and their future prices are perfectly
forseen.
There are additionnal reasons why households are willing to possess an illiquid store of
value such as a durable good, when there is uncertainty and the economical environment
is risky. If we then go beyond these restrictions of desirability and certainty, an answer
is provided by Diaz and Prado [25] who try to clarify the composition of wealth in the
USA, where poorer households hold more illiquid wealth than the richer ones. For that,
they consider two means of savings: financial assets considered liquid and durable goods,
considered illiquid and which main roles are then services providers and collateral for
loans. They establish that “durable goods represent an important fraction of household
wealth”, and confirm the fact that “portfolio becomes more liquid as wealth increases”.
Our model, does not explicit these two types of assets, liquid and illiquid, and does not
allow to determine the composition of the wealth of agents. As a crucial hypothesis to
our model, the desirability of durable goods ensures the purchase of durable goods both
in spot and furures markets, without raising their level of liquidity. But such a feature
may be important and correspond to the notion of equity while introducing financial
markets in a productive economies. In the case where positive profits are possible and
dividends are paid, agents have incentive to buy or hold shares, which liquidity eases the
trade. Considering this framework meets one of the mains perspectives to our thesis.
Whenever increasing returns are allowed, positive profits can be expected, which needs
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to raise the notions of distribution among consumers, fundamental values of a firm that
now consist not only of its remaining capital but take also into account the future profits
it may generate.
The next chapter treats optimality issues, which was motivated by the role that plays
durable goods to restore Pareto optimality in OLG models. Indeed, the relations on
prices at equilibrium partly reflect the characterization provided in Balasko and Shell
[4]. However, our existence result relies on the equivalent economy where consumption
sets are not the positive orthant. This calls for the need to establish a proof compatible
with such a non conventionnal framework.
Chapter 4
Optimal allocations in OLG
models with multiple goods
Abstract
We consider a pure exchange overlapping generations economy with finitely many com-
modities and consumers per period having possibly non-complete non transitive prefer-
ences. We provide a geometric and direct proof of the Balasko-Shell characterization of
Pareto optimal allocation (See, [4]). As a by-product, we compute an explicit Pareto
improving transfer when the criterion is not satisfied, which is minimal for some suitable
distance1.
JEL classification: C62, D50, D62.
Keywords: Overlapping generations model, preference set, normal cone, equilibrium,
Pareto optimality.
1This chapter is based on the paper “Notes on the Characterization of optimal allocations in OLG
models with multiple goods” [14]
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4.1 Introduction
As already well known, OLG equilibrium allocations may lack in being Pareto optimal.
This market failure was established by Samuelson [54], who attributes this phenomenon
as a lack of double coincidence of wants, and suggests to solve this by using the role of
money. Geanakoplos [34] clarifies this phenomenon as a result of two facts: generations
overlap, and infinite horizon. He points some links between the Samuelson model and
the Arrow-Debreu model, and established how a durable good such as money, or an
infinitely lived asset like a land, could restore the market failure.
Balasko and Shell [4] provide a criterion based on the asymptotic behavior of the norm
of the prices to characterize Pareto optimal allocation without durable good or infinitely
lived asset. Burke [17] revisits this criterion by focusing in particular on the right
definition of the Gaussian curvature of the indifference surface. Actually, these authors
provide a proof with a first step considering the special case of a single commodity per
period. Then, the generalization to several commodities is only sketched.
Our purpose in this paper is three fold: to provide a simpler, direct proof of the Balasko-
Shell Criterion considering in one step several consumers for each generation and sev-
eral commodities; to encompass the case of non-complete, non-transitive preferences;
to compute explicitly a Pareto improving transfer when the allocation does not satisfy
the Balasko-Shell Criterion. Nevertheless, note that the structure of the proof is based
strongly on Balasko-Shell’s one.
It is important to remark that a geometrical approach has already been provided by
Borglin and Keiding [16]. They actually consider infinite horizons economies, and treats
the particular case of OLG models. They center the notion of Pareto optimality to its
weak form, and consider characterizations based on parameters that describe the econ-
omy such as supporting prices and curvatures of indifference surfaces, thus an approach
that easily meets our model.
We consider this contribution as a first step to be able in future works to tackle the
question in presence of durable commodities and with heterogeneous longevities of the
agents.
Since, we have no more a representation of the preferences by utility function, we can-
not use the standard differentiability assumption and the link between the curvature of
the indifference surfaces and the second derivative of utility function. So we adopt a
geometric approach to state the assumptions directly on the preferred sets. The smooth-
ness assumption is obtained by assuming that the normal cone is an half line. For the
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upper bound of the curvature, we use the notion of prox-regularity of the complemen-
tary of the preferred set, introduced in variational analysis by Rockafellar and Poliquin
in [49], which is extensively studied by Thibault and Colombo in [21]. For the lower
bound, which is related to the strict convexity of the preferred sets, we assume that the
truncated preferred sets are included in a suitable ball with a large enough radius.
The simplification of the proof comes from the fact that we show that the parameter
αt used in Balasko-Shell work to describe the Pareto improving transfer has a nice
geometric interpretation in terms of a radius of a sphere tangent to the boundary of the
preferred set at the allocation. This remark allows us to use this radius as a particular
distance function and to compute explicitly the minimal Pareto improving transfer when
the criterion is not satisfied.
Details about the model and assumptions are described in Section 2. Some preliminary
results are provided in Section 3. In particular, we characterize the weak Pareto optimal
allocation in term of the existence of a supporting price using the normal cone to the
preferred sets. The end of this Section explains how the multi-consumer case can be
simplified by considering aggregate feasible Pareto improving transfer. In Section 4, we
provide the proof and we show which assumptions are used for the if part and for the
only if part of the criterion. We also provide two examples showing that the result is no
more true if one of the conditions on the curvature does not hold true.
4.2 The model
We2 consider an OLG economy E with infinitely many dates t = 1, 2 . . . At each date
there is a finite set of commodities Lt, and we denote by Lt its cardinal.
At each date t ∈ N, a finite set of individuals It is born, living for two periods, young
at date t and old at date t+ 1. We start with the first generation 0 which lives for only
one period and consists of the old agents at date 1. I = ∪∞t=0It denotes the set of all
individuals and I−0 = ∪∞t=1It.
At each date t ≥ 1, we denote by xi = (xit, xit+1) the consumption by an individual i in
It, which is an element of the consumption set Xi = RLt+ ×RLt+1+ . The consumption set
of consumers of generation 0 is Xi = RL1+ .
2Notations. We consider several finite dimensional Euclidean space RL. In each of them, RL+ is the
standard positive cone and RL++ its interior. x ≤ y means that y − x ∈ RL+, x · y denotes the standard
inner product of the vectors x and y, ‖x‖ = √x · x denotes the standard Euclidean norm. If P is a
subset of RL, P¯ denotes its closure and intP , its interior. B(x, r) (resp. B¯(x, r)) denotes the open (resp.
closed) ball of center x and radius r.
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Consumers preferences are represented by a (strict) preference relation P i : Xi → Xi:
for all i ∈ I:
ξi ∈ P i(xi) means that ξi is strictly preferred to xi.
ξi ∈ P¯ i(xi), the closure of P i(xi), if and only if ξi is preferred or indifferent to xi.
For all t ≥ 0, i ∈ It, we denote by NP¯ i(xi)(xi) the normal cone3 of P¯ i(xi) at xi.
We now posit the main assumption, which is maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption A.
a) For all individual i in I, P i(xi) is open in Xi, convex, xi ∈ P¯ i(xi) \ P i(xi). For all
i ∈ I−0 P i(xi) + (RLt+ × RLt+1+ ) ⊂ P i(xi) and for i ∈ I0, P i(xi) + RL1+ ⊂ P i(xi).
b) Each consumer i is endowed with some endowments ei of the goods during his
lifetime: for all i ∈ I, ei ∈ Xi and for all i ∈ I0, ei ∈ RL1+ . For each period t ≥ 1,
et denotes the total endowments at this date, that is, et =
∑
i∈It−1∪It e
i.
c) For all i ∈ I, for all xi in the interior ofXi, −NP¯ i(xi)(xi) is a half line {tγi(xi) | t ≥ 0},
defined by γi(xi) which is a continuous mapping on the interior of Xi satisfying
‖γi(xi)‖ = 1. For all xi in the interior of Xi, for all i ∈ I−0, , γi(xi) ∈ RLt++×RLt+1++
and for all i ∈ I0, γi(xi) ∈ RL1++.
Assumption A is a classical assumption in a standard finite economy. If the preferences
are represented by a utility function, it means that it is continuous, quasi-concave,
strictly increasing and smooth on the interior of Xi.
At each date t, there is a spot market for the L commodities. The spot price vector
p is an element of
∏∞
t=1R
Lt
++ and pt` is the spot price of commodity ` at date t. We
consider the set of normalized prices ∆ := {p ∈ ∏∞t=1RLt++ | ‖p1‖ = 1}. We denote by
Πt = (pt, pt+1), for t ≥ 1, and Π0 = p1.
Budget Constraints
The budget constraint at a given price p, for each agent i ∈ I−0 is given by:
Πt · xi = pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 ≤ Πt · ei = pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1,
3NP¯ i(xi)(x
i) = {q ∈ RL × RL | q · (z − xi) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ P¯ i(xi)}
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and for each agent i ∈ I0,
Π0 · xi = p1 · xi1 ≤ Π0 · ei = p1 · ei1.
4.3 Preliminary results
Let us recall some basic definitions of equilibrium and optimal allocations in a standard
pure exchange OLG economy with multiple commodities.
Definition 4.3.1. An equilibrium of the economy E is a list (p∗, (xi∗)) in ∆×∏∞t=0∏i∈It Xi
such that:
a) for all i ∈ I, (xi∗) is a maximal element for P i in the budget set associated to the
equilibrium price p∗, that is, for all i ∈ I, Πt · xi∗ ≤ Πt · ei, and for all xi ∈ P i(xi∗),
Πt · xi > Πt · ei.
b) the allocation (xi∗) is feasible:
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xi∗t = et =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
eit, for t ≥ 1
Proposition 4.3.1. Under Assumption A, if the initial endowments are strictly positive,
the OLG economy E has an equilibrium.
Proof. The existence of an equilibrium can be proved following the same procedure as
in [3], using the existence result in finite dimension of Gale and Mas-Colell [31], [32], see
also Florenzano [28]. 4
Definition 4.3.2. The feasible allocation x in
∏
i∈I X
i is Pareto optimal (PO) (resp.
weakly Pareto optimal (WPO)) if there is no (yi) in
∏
i∈I X
i such that:
∑
i∈It−1∪It
yit = et, for t ≥ 1
and for all i ∈ I, yi ∈ P¯ i(xi), with yi ∈ P i(xi) for at least one individual i (resp. and
there exists t ≥ 1 such that for all t ≥ t, for all i ∈ It, yi = xi).
We remark that a PO allocation is WPO.
Definition 4.3.3. Let x = (xi) be an allocation in
∏
i∈I X
i. The price p ∈ ∆ is said to
support x if for each t ∈ N, for all i ∈ It and for all ξi ∈ P i(xi), Πt · ξi > Πt · xi.
4Main steps of the proof are provided in Appendix B
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Remark 4.3.1. Every competitive allocation x∗ = (xi∗) associated with the equilibrium
price p∗ ∈ ∆ is supported by p∗.
If x = (xi), an interior allocation, is supported by the price p, then for all i ∈ I, there
exists λi > 0 such that γi(xi) = λiΠt.
Lemma 4.1. If x = (xi), an interior allocation, is WPO, then, for all t ≥ 0, γi(xi) =
γj(xj) for all i, j ∈ It.
Proof. Let t ≥ 0. Since (xi) is WPO, ∑i∈It xi /∈ ∑i∈It P i(xi). Indeed, if it would not
hold, then there exists (ξi)i∈It ∈
∏
i∈It P
i(xi), such that
∑
i∈It x
i =
∑
i∈It ξ
i. Then,
one easily checks that the allocation (yi) defined by yi = xi for i /∈ It and yi = ξi for
i ∈ It is feasible and Pareto dominates (xi), which is in contradiction with the weak
Pareto optimality of (xi).
By Assumption A, (P i(xi))i∈It are convex and nonempty, and for all i, xi /∈ P i(xi) and
xi ∈ P¯ i(xi). So, for each i ∈ It, there exists a sequence (ξiν) of P i(xi), which converges to
xi. The set
∑
i∈It P
i(xi) being convex, so by using the standard separation theorem for
convex sets in finite-dimensional space for
∑
i∈It x
i and
∑
i∈It P
i(xi), there exists q 6= 0
such that q ·∑i∈It xi ≤ q ·∑i∈It ξi for all (ξi) ∈ ∏i∈It P i(xi). Consider an individual
i0 in It. Then for all ξi0 ∈ P i0(xi0), q · xi0 + q ·
∑
i∈It,i 6=i0 x
i ≤ q · ξi0 + q ·∑i∈It,i 6=i0 ξiν .
By taking the limit, we obtain: q · xi0 ≤ q · ξi0 , which means that q belongs to the
cone −NP¯ i0 (xi0 )(xi0), thus q = ‖q‖γi0(xi0). By repeating the same reasoning for all
individuals of It, we establish that γi(xi) = 1‖q‖q for all i ∈ It. 
Lemma 4.2. The interior allocation x = (xi) is WPO if and only if there exists a price
sequence p ∈ ∆ which supports x = (xi).
Proof. Let x be supported by a price sequence p. Assume that x is not WPO, then there
exists a feasible allocation (yi) and some t ≥ 1 such that xi = yi for all i ∈ It, t ≥ t,
where yi ∈ P¯ i(xi) for all i ∈ I and yi ∈ P i(xi) for at least an individual. Therefore, for
all t and for all i ∈ It, Πt · yi ≥ Πt · xi with at least one strict inequality for i0 ∈ It0
where t0 < t. Thus, we have:
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
yi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
yi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
yit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1
yit >
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
xi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
xit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1
xit
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Since, yit = x
i
t for all i ∈ It, t ≥ t, we get:
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
yi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
yi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
yit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1
yit >
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
xi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
xit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit
which is in contradiction with the feasibility of (yi) implying
∑
i∈It−1∪It x
i
t =
∑
i∈It−1∪It y
i
t =
et.
Conversely, let x be a WPO allocation. We first truncate the economy at a finite horizon
t by considering the t first generations. Denote Jt−1 =
∏t−1
τ=0 Iτ . We shall prove the
result by induction on the truncation at t.
First, consider the truncated economy E1 at date t = 1, which consists of the generation
0, I0. From Lemma 4.1, p1 = γi(xi) for any i ∈ I0 supports (xi)i∈I0 .
Now, suppose that (p1, . . . pt) is supporting (x
i)i∈Jt−1 , and let us prove that there is a
unique pt+1  0 such that (p1, . . . pt+1) supports (xi)i∈Jt . From Lemma 4.1, for any
i0 ∈ It, γi0(xi0) supports xi for all i ∈ It. So, it suffices to prove that γi0t (xi0) is collinear
to pt and then to choose pt+1 =
‖pt‖
‖γi0t (xi0 )‖
γi0t+1(x
i0).
We consider a reduced economy with Lt commodities, the individuals in It−1 ∪ It and
the preferences defined by Qi(ξi) = P i(xit−1, ξi) for i ∈ It−1 and Qi(ξi) = P i(ξi, xit+1)
for i ∈ It. Since x is a WPO allocation, the allocation (xit)i∈It−1∪It is Pareto optimal
in this finite economy. We also remark that −NQi(xit)(xit) = {λγit(xit−1, xit) | λ ≥ 0} for
i ∈ It−1 and −NQi(xit)(xit) = {λγit(xit, xit+1) | λ ≥ 0} for i ∈ It. So, using the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we prove that the vectors ((γit(x
i
t−1, xit))i∈It−1
and (γit(x
i
t, x
i
t+1))i∈It) are colinear. Since (pt−1, pt) supports xi for any i ∈ It−1, pt is
colinear to γit(x
i
t−1, xit)), so it is also colinear to γit(xit, xit+1) for all i ∈ It. 
Definition of aggregate Pareto improving transfers
The proof of the main result studies the behavior of Pareto improving transfers that we
now introduce. In the following, we distinguish transfers and aggregate transfers. For
an allocation (xi), for each generation t, we define an aggregate preferred set as follows:
P¯t((x
i)) :=
∑
i∈It
P¯ i(xi)
From Assumption A, P¯t((x
i)) is a closed convex subset of RLt+ × RLt+1+ (or RL1+ for the
generation 0) and satisfies P¯t((x
i)) + (RLt+ × RLt+1+ ) ⊂ P¯t((xi)) (or P¯t((xi)) + RL1+ ⊂
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P¯t((x
i)) for the generation 0). The closedness of P¯t((x
i)) is ensured by the fact that
P¯ i(xi) is a nonempty closed subset of RLt+ ×RLt+1+ for all i ∈ It. Indeed, for all t and for
all i ∈ It, the asymptotic cones 5 AP¯ i(xi) = RLt+ ×RLt+1+ are positively semi-independent
6, a sufficient condition for a finite sum of closed sets to be closed.
If x = (xi) is an interior allocation supported by the price p ∈ ∆ and xt = ∑i∈It xi.
Then one checks that for all t ≥ 0, for all i ∈ It,
NP¯t((xi))(x¯
t) = {λΠt | λ ≥ 0} = {λγi(xi) | λ ≥ 0}
Definition 4.3.4. (a) For a given feasible allocation x = (xi), the sequence of commodity
transfers h = (hi) ∈ ∏i∈I0 RL1 × ∏∞t=1∏i∈It(RLt × RLt+1) is feasible if (xi + hi) is
feasible, which means that (xi + hi) belongs to
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i and
∑
i∈It−1∪It h
i
t = 0.
(b) The sequence of commodity transfers h = (hi) is Pareto improving upon x = (xi)
if h is feasible and x + h Pareto dominates x, that is for all t ≥ 1 and all i ∈ It,
xi + hi ∈ P¯ i(xi), with xi + hi ∈ P i(xi) for at least one agent i.
(c) An aggregate transfer h¯ ∈ RL1 ×∏∞t=1RLt × RLt+1 is feasible if h¯t−1t = −h¯tt for all
t ≥ 1 and Pareto improving upon the allocation x = (xi) if:
i) for all t, xt =
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t ∈ P¯t((xi))
ii) there exists t such that xt =
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t ∈ int(P¯t((xi)))
By the very definition of Pareto optimality, the allocation x = (xi) is Pareto optimal
if and only if there exists no feasible Pareto improving transfer upon x. But, we also
remark that the interior allocation x = (xi) is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists
no feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon x. So, in the next section, we will
be able to work only on aggregate feasible transfers and not on feasible transfers, which
will greatly simplify the notations and the formulas.
If there exists h¯, an agregate Pareto improving transfer, then let t ≥ 0, by definition
of P¯t((x
i)), there exists (ξi)i∈It in
∏
i∈It P¯
i(xi) such that
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t =
∑
i∈It ξ
i. By
letting hi = ξi − xi, we easily check that xi + hi ∈ P¯ i(xi) for all i ∈ It.
Furthermore, for t,
∑
i∈It x
i+h¯t−α(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈ P¯ t((xi)), for some λ > 0 small enough.
Then there exists (ξi) ∈∏i∈It P¯ i(xi) such that ∑i∈It xi+ h¯t−λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) = ∑i∈It ξi.
5Asymptotic cones are a generalization of recession cones of convex sets as defined in Rockafellar [52].
Here, since the P¯ i(xi) is closed and convex, its asymptotic cone coincides with its recession cone, which
consists of the set of all directions in which P¯ i(xi) is unbounded.
6In Debreu [19], two cones A and B of Rm are positively semi-independent if x ∈ A and y ∈ B such
that x + y = 0 implies that x = y = 0.
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Let us consider the individual i0 ∈ It, we can then write h¯t =
∑
i 6=i0(ξ
i − xi) + (ξi0 −
xi0) + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1). Take h
i = ξi− xi and hi0 = ξi0 − xi0 + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1). We note that
xi0 + hi0 = ξi0 + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈ P i0((xi0)). So, h is a Pareto improving transfer and x
is not Pareto optimal.
Conversely, if x is not Pareto optimal, there exists h a Pareto improving transfer. From
the convexity of P i(xi) (Assumption A(a)), (1/2)h is a Pareto improving transfer. We
now check that h¯ defined by h¯t = (1/2)
∑
i∈It h
i is an aggregate Pareto improving
transfer. h¯ is obviously feasible since h is feasible. For all t, since (1/2)h is Pareto
improving, xt + h¯t ∈ P¯t((xi)), with xt =
∑
i∈It x
i. Since xi is an interior allocation,
xi + (1/2)hi belongs to the interior of Xi for all i. For the agent i0 of generation t0 such
that xi0 + hi0 ∈ P i0(xi0), since P i0(xi0) is open (Assumption A(a)), one gets that there
exists λ > 0 such that xi0 +(1/2)hi0−λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈ P i0(xi0). So,
∑
i∈It0 x
i+(1/2)hi−
λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈
∑
i∈It0 P¯
i(xi) = P¯ t0((xi)), which implies that
∑
i∈It0 x
i + (1/2)hi ∈
int(P¯t0((x
i))).
4.4 Characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations
We now state the main result of the paper. It provides a condition on the supporting
price of a weak Pareto optimal allocation, which is necessary and sufficient for the Pareto
optimality of the given allocation.
Proposition 4.4.1. Let x = (xi) ∈∏i∈I Xi be a WPO allocation supported by the price
sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . pt, . . .). We suppose that:
Assumption B: there exist χ¯ > 0 and χ > 0 such that for all t ≥ 1, e¯t ≤ χ¯1Lt ,
χ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ≤ xi for all i ∈ It and χ1L1 ≤ xi for all i ∈ I0;
Assumption C: there exists r > 0 such that for all i ∈ I, B(xi + rγi(xi), r) ⊂ P i(xi);
Assumption C’: there exists r¯ > 0 such that for all i ∈ I−0 (resp. i ∈ I0), for all
ξi ∈ P¯ i(xi), if ξi ≤ (et, et+1), then ξi ∈ B¯(xi + r¯γi(xi), r¯) (resp. if ξi ≤ e1, then
ξi ∈ B¯(xi + r¯γi(xi), r¯);
Assumption G: there exists ν ≥ ν > 0 such that for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ It,
ν ≤ ‖γ
i
t(x
i)‖
‖γit+1(xi)‖
≤ ν
Then, x is Pareto optimal if and only if:
∑
t∈N∗
1
‖pt‖ = +∞.
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Since x is supported by the price sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . pt, . . .), we recall that Lemma
4.1 implies that for all period t, for all i ∈ It, 1‖Πt‖Πt = 1‖(pt,pt+1)‖(pt, pt+1) is equal to
γi(xi). We denote by γt the vector 1‖Πt‖Πt and we let x
t =
∑
i∈It x
i.
Remark 4.4.1. i) Assumptions C and C’ mean that the boundaries of the preferred sets
lie below small closed balls of radius r and above the comprehensive hull of bigger closed
balls of radius r¯. Assumptions C and C’ means that the preferences are smooth and
uniformly strictly convex. While Assumptions C and C’ in [4] are stated in terms of
curvature of the utility functions, we have chosen a more geometric approach because
the preferences are not representable by a utility function.
For each individual i, let us consider the closed set F i defined as the complementery
of P i(xi), F i := {P i(xi). Then Assumption C means that F i is prox-regular at xi.
Indeed, let r > 0 and β > 0. The set F is called (r, β)- prox-regular at x ∈ F , if for any
y ∈ F ∩B(x, β) and any v ∈ NP (F, y) with ‖v‖ ≤ 1, y ∈ ProjF (y+ rv) where NP (F, y)
is the proximal normal cone to F at y, that is:
NP (F, y) = {v | ∃ρ > 0, y ∈ ProjF (y + ρv)}
In our framework, under Assumption A,
NP (F, y) = {µγ(y) | µ ≥ 0}
The notion of prox-regularity was introduced by Poliquin and Rockafellar, as a new
important regularity in variational analysis, see [49], and extensively studied by Colombo
and Thibault in [21].
ii) Note that Assumption B implies that the number of individuals is uniformly bounded
above at each generation. Indeed, if It is the number of individual of the generation t,
and h is a commodity at period t, then Itχ ≤
∑
i∈It x
i
h ≤ eth ≤ χ¯. We denote by I¯, an
upper bound of the number of individual at each generation.
iii) Assumptions C and C’ still hold when we aggregate the finitely many consumers at
each period by considering the set P¯ t((xi)). Assumption C implies B(xt + Itrγ
t, Itr) ⊂∑
i∈It P
i(xi), thus, whatever is the number of consumers of generation t, B(xt+rγt, r) ⊂
intP¯ t((xi)).
Let ξt ∈ P¯ t((xi)) such that ξt ≤ (et, et+1). Then Assumption C’ implies that ξt belongs
to
∑
i∈It B¯(x
i + r¯γi(xi), r¯), which is equal to B¯(xt + Itr¯γ
i(xi), Itr¯). So uniformly in t,
ξt belongs to B¯(xi + I¯ r¯γi(xi), I¯ r¯).
For the coherence of the notations, we let ρ = r and ρ¯ = I¯ r¯.
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iv) We remark that Assumption G is slightly weaker than Property G in Balasko and
Shell in [4]. Indeed, Property G assumes that the ratio ps`‖Πt‖ is uniformly bounded above
and away from 0 for all period t, for s = t, t + 1 and for all commodities ` at date t or
t + 1. Recalling that Πt is positively collinear to γ
t, this clearly implies that the ratio
‖γtt‖
‖γtt+1‖ is uniformly bounded above and away from 0 for all period t.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1 . Since the allocation x = (xi) is Pareto optimal if and
only if there exists no feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon x, the proof
will be established by constructing and characterizing a sequence of aggregate Pareto
improving transfers.
Let h¯ be a feasible aggregate transfer. Set ηt := Πt · h¯t, the net present value of the
aggregate transfer h¯ at each date t.
Remark 4.4.2. If h¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon (xi), then by
Definition 4.3.4, xt+ h¯t ∈ P¯ t((xi)), so thanks to Assumption C’, Πt · h¯t > 0, thus ηt > 0.
Let us define the sequence α by:
αt :=
‖h¯t‖2‖Πt‖
Πt · h¯t
=
‖h¯t‖2‖Πt‖
ηt
Remark 4.4.3. i) Note that ‖h¯t‖2 = αtηt‖Πt‖ ≤
αt‖Πt‖‖h¯t‖
‖Πt‖ , thus ‖h¯t‖ ≤ αt. Thus, if α is
bounded then h¯ is also bounded.
ii) α
t
2 actually represents the radius of the sphere S(x
t + α
t
2 γ
t, α
t
2 ) which is tangent to
P¯ t((xi)) at xt, and contains xt + h¯t. Indeed, we easily check that:∥∥∥∥xt + h¯t − (xt + αt2 γt
)∥∥∥∥ = αt2
We prepare the proof by three lemmas and then we prove the necessary and the sufficient
condition in two additional lemmas.
Lemma 4.3. If the feasible aggregate transfer h¯ is Pareto improving upon x = (xi), and
if Assumption C ′ holds, then the sequence α is bounded from above.
Proof. Since h¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer, 0 ≤ ξt = xt + h¯t ≤
(et, et+1). So, from Assumption C
′ and Remark 4.4.1, ξt ∈ B¯(xt + ρ¯γt, ρ¯). Hence, from
Remark 4.4.3 (ii), the sphere S(xt + α
t
2 γ
t, α
t
2 ), which is tangent to P¯
t((xi)) at xt, and
contains ξt is included in B¯(xt + ρ¯ Πt‖Πt‖ , ρ¯). So
αt
2 ≤ ρ¯, which shows that α is bounded
from above. 
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Lemma 4.4. If h¯ is a feasible Pareto improving aggregate transfer, then:
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
‖h¯t‖2 ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]
Proof. Indeed, the construction of η and the feasibility of the transfer h allow us to
write:
η0 = p1 · h¯0 = p1 · h¯01 = −p1 · h¯11
η1 = Π1 · h¯1 = p1 · h¯11 + p2 · h¯12 = −p1 · h¯01 + p2 · h¯12
. . .
ηt = Πt · h¯t = pt · h¯tt + pt+1 · h¯tt+1 = −pt · h¯t−1t + pt+1 · h¯tt+1
By summing up, we obtain that: η0 + η1 + . . .+ ηt = pt+1 · h¯tt+1, with h¯tt = −h¯t−1t
By definition,
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
(‖h¯tt‖2 + ‖h¯tt+1‖2)
By Schwarz inequality, (pt · h¯tt)2 ≤ ‖pt‖2‖h¯tt‖2, that is:
(
pt·h¯tt
‖pt‖
)2 ≤ ‖h¯tt‖2, we then obtain
that:
αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
(pt · h¯tt)2
‖pt‖2 +
(pt+1 · h¯tt+1)2
‖pt+1‖2
]
Hence,
αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]

Lemma 4.5. Let η be a positive sequence in R. Let us define an aggregate transfer h¯
in RL1 ×∏∞t=1(RLt × RLt+1) and the associated α respectively by:
h¯tt+1 =
(
η0 + η1 + . . .+ ηt
) pt+1
‖pt+1‖2 and h¯
t
t = −h¯t−1t
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
‖h¯t‖2 = ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]
Under Assumptions B and C, if α is bounded then there exists µ > 0 such that µh¯ is a
feasible Pareto improving aggregate transfer.
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Remark 4.4.4. In Lemma 4.5, h¯ is computed in such a way that Πt · h¯t = ηt and the
associated αt is the smallest possible one.
Proof. Let µ > 0 be taken small enough so that µαt < 2ρ, for all t, which is feasible
since α = (αt) is bounded.
From the formula above and Remark 4.4.3 (ii), since µα
t
2 ≤ ρ, xt + µh¯t belongs to the
sphere S(xt + µα
t
2 γ
t, µα
t
2 ) ⊂ B(xt + ργt, ρ) ∪ {xt}. Since h¯t 6= 0, xt + µh¯t ∈ B(xt +
ργt, ρ) \ {xt}. From Assumption C and Remark 4.4.1 (iii), xt + µh¯t ∈ intP¯ t((xi)), that
is µh¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon the allocation (xi). 
Lemma 4.6. Given the positive price sequence p, if x is not PO, then under Assumption
C ′,
∑
t∈N∗
1
‖pt‖ < +∞.
Proof. Since x is not PO, there exists a Pareto improving aggregate transfer h¯. From
Lemma 4.3, the associated α is bounded from above by 2ρ¯, thus, from Lemma 4.4:
2ρ¯ ≥ αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt‖pt+1‖2 [η
0 + . . .+ ηt]2 ≥ 1
ηt‖pt+1‖ [η
0 + . . .+ ηt]2
since ‖Πt‖‖pt+1‖ =
√
1 + ‖pt‖
2
‖pt+1‖2 ≥ 1. Thus:
1
‖pt+1‖ ≤
2ρ¯ηt
[η0 + . . .+ ηt]2
But, we notice that:
ηt
[η0 + . . . ηt]2
≤ 1
η0 + . . .+ ηt−1
− 1
η0 + . . .+ ηt
This implies that:
∞∑
t=1
ηt
[η0 + . . .+ ηt]2
≤ 1
η0
Hence ∞∑
t=1
1
‖pt‖ =
2ρ¯
η0
< +∞

Remark 4.4.5. The following example shows that if preferences are flat at the given
allocation, so not satisfying Assumption C’, then the allocation could be not Pareto
optimal even if
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ = +∞. Let us consider an OLG economy with one commodity
Notes on Characterization of optimal allocations in OLG models 79
per period, one consumer per generation, the allocation (1, 1) for all generation and the
preferred set {ξ ∈ R2+ | tξt + (t + 1)ξt+1 > 2t + 1}. Then, one easily check that this
allocation is not Pareto optimal because the allocation (1/2, 3/2) for each generation
is Pareto dominating But, one also checks that the price (1, 2, . . . , t, . . .) supports this
allocation and
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ =
∑
t
1
t = +∞.
The last step of the proof of Proposition 4.4.1 is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Under Assumptions B, C and G, if the positive price sequence p satisfies∑
t
1
‖pt‖ < +∞, then x is not PO.
Proof. Consider ηt = 1‖pt‖ for all t, and denote by η¯
t :=
∑t
s=1 η
t. Note that (η¯t)
is bounded. Let the corresponding agregate transfer h¯ and the associated sequence α
defined by the formula of Lemma 4.5. From this Lemma, it remains to show that α is
bounded.
From Lemma 4.5, we have: h¯t = (η¯t−1 pt‖pt‖2 , η¯
t pt+1
‖pt+1‖2 ). Consequently, since η¯
t−1 ≤
η¯t, ‖h¯t‖2 = (η¯t−1)2 1‖pt‖2 + (η¯t)2 1‖pt+1‖2 ≤ (η¯t)2
(
1
‖pt‖2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2
)
. Since ηt = 1‖pt‖ , the
associated α defined in Lemma 4.5 satisfies:
αt = ‖Πt‖ηt ‖h¯t‖2 ≤ ‖Πt‖‖pt‖(η¯t)2
(
1
‖pt‖2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2
)
=
√‖pt‖2 + ‖pt+1‖2 (η¯t)2‖pt‖ (1 + ‖pt‖2‖pt+1‖2)
= (η¯t)2
√
1 + ‖pt+1‖
2
‖pt‖2
(
1 + ‖pt‖
2
‖pt+1‖2
)
Assumption G implies that ‖pt‖‖pt+1‖ and
‖pt+1‖
‖pt‖ are bounded. Since η¯
t is bounded, α is so.

Remark 4.4.6. The following example shows that if preferences exhibit a kink at the
given allocation, so not satisfying Assumption C, then the allocation could be Pareto
optimal even if
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ < +∞. Let us consider an OLG economy with one commodity
per period, one consumer per generation, the allocation (1, 1) for all generation and
the same preferred set {(1, 1)} + R2++. Then, one easily checks that this allocation is
Pareto optimal because to strictly improve the welfare of an agent, we need to reduce
the allocation of the agent of the next generation when she is young so that her welfare
strictly decreases. But, one also checks that the price (1, 2, . . . , 2t, . . .) supports this
allocation and
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ is finite.
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4.5 Conclusion
Providing a simple set-theoretic and geometric version of the proof of Balasko and Shell
[4] has allowed us to directly consider the multi-goods case 7, while in [4], the proof
needs to first go through the one-commodity case. We have encompassed the case of
non-complete and non-transitive preferences where basic assumptions are made on the
preference sets and the associated normal cones. We provide a characterization of Pareto
optimality that is established following a simple and geometric version of the proof of
Balasko and Shell [4]. Moreover, we provide an explicit expression of improving transfers
ht at each date t, that do not satisfy the criterion. Indeed, this is easily obtained thanks
to the minimal value of the parameter α that is also used in [4].
A natural continuation to this work would be the extension to the case of OLG models
with heterogeneous longevities within each generation. In this case, we would need
to review some hypotheses concerning for instance the initial endowments and strict
monotony of utility functions. We also propose to extend this work to the case of OLG
models with durable commodities. As established in the previous chapter 3, Section 3.3,
such an extension calls for an optimality characterization to the non conventional case
where the consumption sets do not consist of the positive orthant anymore.
7Note that in [14], we have considered the particular case where Lt = L for all t.
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General Conclusion
In this thesis, we have considered OLG models with production, where we go beyond
the classical hypothesis of constant returns. We have then provided a formalization of
incresing returns by allowing firms to behave in a more general way through the notion
of pricing rule. Although losses may occur, we focus on loss-free pricing rules that are
relevant in unregulated markets and can be applied to firms whose increasing returns
are due to fixed cost or associated to a S-shape production function, which means that
the technology displays first increasing returns to scale until some level of production
then decreasing returns to scale. Since we assume that firms are privately owned and
inaction is possible, this principle instructs firms to produce only when the profits are
non-negative, otherwise they close down. These pricing rules allow us to give also account
of some models that treat growth theory and provide structures that permit to reconcile
competitive behavior of firms and increasing returns by associating them to imperfect
competition. These structures have the advantage to show how firms can exploit their
market power in presence of increasing returns by charging prices that will bring them
positive profits. This approach clearly constitutes a variant of loss-free pricing rules.
Beyond the existence result, we are led to study the mechanism of transfer between
generations in order to analyze the possible perpetuation of firms. We then incorporate
durable goods which may be stored from one period to a successive period through a
linear technology. In this model, we establish not only the existence of an equilibrium but
also highlight features of durable goods that entitle consumers, the roles of producers,
lenders and borrowers, even at the end of their lifetime. Allowing agents to hold assets
at the end of their lifetime is relevant when their lifetimes are actually uncertain. This
extension is easily obtained from our model. A natural continuation to this work is the
introduction of a production, where durable goods are involved and increasing returns
are allowed.
Another important result on the relation between prices allows us to make a link with
the Pareto efficiency of equilibrium, confirming their role in restoring the market fail-
ure in OLG economies. We review the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations,
in the line of Balasko and Shell [4], but in addition we allow for multiple agents and
multiple goods per period. Our approach is set-theoretic and geometrical. The con-
sumers characteristics are described by their consumption sets, their preference sets and
the associated normal cones. We give conditions of Pareto optimality, under very basic
assumptions, by providing a simple and geometric version of the proof of Balasko and
Shell [4], encompassing the case of non-complete and non-transitive preferences. As part
of the motivations of this chapter, a future work will consist of including durable goods
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and characterizing optimal allocations in a framework where the consumption sets do
not consist of the positive orthant anymore.
Throughout this thesis, we have raised aditionnal issues but we have also accumulated
further tools and intuitions that will be important and helpful for further studies, es-
pecially in production economies where increasing returns are allowed and thus growth
can be expected. Indeed, increasing returns may induce losses, but in the long run,
the economy may grow to an efficient allocation, where there are no losses. This meets
the notion of dynamical efficiency, an issue that deserves a deeper consideration, and
constitutes a natural perspective to this thesis.
Appendix A
On the equivalent economy
with“no” durable goods
Boundedness of A(E˜)
Let e ∈∏t∈N∗ RL+ be defined by e˜t = ∑i∈It∪It−1 e˜it and e′ ∈∏t∈N∗ RL+ such that e′ ≥ e˜.
Let (χi) ∈ A(E˜), with χi = (xit, ξit+1, ζit+2), then for all t = 1, 2 . . .,
∑
i∈I0
ξi1 +
∑
i∈I1
xi1 ≤ e′1
∑
i∈It−2
ζit +
∑
i∈It−1
ξit +
∑
i∈It
xit ≤ e′t, t > 1
For the first period, define M1 := e
′
1. Since ξ
i
1 ≥ 0 and xi1 ≥ 0, we have 0 ≤ xi1 ≤M1 for
i ∈ I0, and 0 ≤ ξi1 ≤M1 for i ∈ I1.
For the second period, let M2 := e
′
2 + Γ
1(M1).
For i ∈ I0, since ζi2 = −Γ1(ξi1), we have: −Γ1(M1) ≤ ζi2 ≤ 0.
By definition, we know that:
∑
i∈I0
ζi2 +
∑
i∈I1
ξi2 ≥
∑
i∈I0
−Γ1(ξi1)−
∑
i∈I1
Γ1(xi1) ≥ −Γ1(e′1)
Thus, for i ∈ I2, 0 ≤ xi2 ≤
∑
i∈I2 x
i
2 ≤ e′2 −
∑
i∈I0 ζ
i
2 −
∑
i∈I1 ξ
i
2 ≤ e′2 + Γ1(e′1), that is:
0 ≤ xi2 ≤M2.
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For i ∈ I1, it is clear that ζi2 ≥ −Γ1(e′1). Futhermore,
ζi2 +
∑
i′∈I1,i′ 6=i
ζi
′
2 ≤ e′2 −
∑
i∈I0
ζi2
But, ∑
i′∈I1,i′ 6=i
ζi
′
2 +
∑
i∈I0
ζi2 ≥ −Γ(
∑
i′∈I1,i′ 6=i
xi1)− Γ(
∑
i∈I0
ξi1) ≥ −Γ(e′1)
Thus, for i ∈ I1, −Γ1(M1) ≤ ζi2 ≤ e′2 + Γ(e′1) = M2.
For period t ≥ 3, we recursively proceed with the same reasoning to prove that the se-
quence of nonnegative vectors (Mt)t≥1, defined byMt = e′t+Γt−1(Mt−1+Γt−2(Mt−2) · · ·+
Γ1(M1)), where M1 = e
′
1satisfies the desired inequalities.

Proof of Lemma 3.1
There is no modification concerning the budget constraints feasibility, we just have to
look at Condition (b) for the period τ−1 in the definition of a pseudo-equilibrium. Since
(p¯∗, (a¯i∗)) is a pseudo-equilibrium in the economy Eτ¯ and τ¯ − 1 > τ − 1, one has:∑
i∈I τ¯−20
a¯i∗τ−1 =
∑
i∈I τ¯−20
e˜τ¯ iτ−1
Considering the definition of X τ¯ i, for all i ∈ ∪τ¯−1t=τ It, a¯i∗τ−1 = 0. From the definition of
e˜τ¯ i, for all i ∈ ∪τ¯−1t=τ It, e˜τ¯ iτ−1 = 0. So, one deduces that:∑
i∈I τ¯−20
a¯i∗τ−1 =
∑
i∈Iτ−20
a¯i∗τ−1 +
∑
i∈Iτ−1
a¯i∗τ−1 =
∑
i∈Iτ−20
e˜τ¯ iτ−1 +
∑
i∈Iτ−1
e˜τ−1
and since
∑
i∈Iτ−1 a¯
i∗
τ−1 ≥ 0, we have:
∑
i∈Iτ−20
a¯i∗τ−1 ≤
∑
i∈Iτ−20
e˜τ¯ iτ−1 +
∑
i∈Iτ−1
e˜τ−1
So we get Condition (b) for the period τ − 1 since a¯i∗τ−1 = aˆi∗τ−1 and e˜τ¯ iτ−1 = e˜τiτ−1 for all
i ∈ I τ¯−20 and e˜τ¯ iτ−1 = e˜iτ−1 for all i ∈ Iτ−1.

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Proof of Lemma 3.2
The first part comes from the strict monotonicity of the utility of agent i ∈ It, for all
t = 1, 2 . . . τ − 1, as mentionned in Assumption C.
We normalize a non zero equilibrium price p∗ so that
∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈L p
∗
t` = 1.
Let us consider a sequence of pseudo-equilibria (pν , (aiν)) that converges to (p¯, (a¯i)). We
prove that (p¯, (a¯i)) is also a pseudo-equilibrium.
We easily establish that (p¯, (a¯i)) satisfies Condition (b) in Definition 3 of pseudo-equilibrium.
So it remains to show that Condition (a) is also satisfied.
Denote by (wiν) the associated wealth sequence and by w¯i its limit. One easily shows that
the budget constraint is satisfied by a¯i. If p¯·ai < w¯i, then for ν large enough, pν ·ai ≤ wiν .
But this implies that u˜i(ai) ≤ u˜i(aiν), and by the continuity of u˜i, u˜i(ai) ≤ u˜i(a¯i). Thus
(p¯, (a¯i)) satisfies Condition (a) in Definition 3.4.2 of a quasi-equilibrium. Thus (p¯, (a¯i))
is actually a “pseudo-quasi-equilibrium”. But thanks to the irreducibility condition, we
can discard the possibility of minimal wealth at any quasi-equilibrium price. Thus each
agent is an utility maximizer at any quasi-equilibrium price. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3
We have established that for all T ≥ 2, there exists a pseudo-equilibrium (pT , (aiT )) of
the truncated economy E˜T . Since pT1 6= 0, we normalize pT so that
∑
`∈L p
T
1` = 1.
We extend the price and the allocations to the whole space
∏∞
t=1RL by adding zeros for
the missing components without modifying the notations. So, now the sequences (pT ),
(aiT ) are in
∏∞
t=1RL.
If Lemma 3.3 is not true, then there exist t¯ and an increasing sequence (T ν) such that
pT
ν
t¯ ≥ ν1. Let τ > t¯+ 3. We assume without any loss of generality that T ν > τ for all
ν.
Now we consider the restriction to the τ first period of the T ν-equilibrium (pT
ν
, (aiT
ν
)):
- for all i ∈ Iτ−20 , aiν is the restriction of aiT
ν
to
∏τ
t=1RL;
- pν is the restriction of pT
ν
to
∏τ
t=1RL.
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From Lemma 3.1 in the previous section, (pν , (xiν))) is a pseudo-equilibrium of the
truncated economy Eτ . We now renormalize the price pν as follows:
piν =
1∑τ
t=1
∑
`∈L p
ν
t`
pν
Since piν is nonnegative, the sequence piν remains in the simplex of
∏τ
t=1RL, which is
compact. From the boundedness of A(E˜τ (e)), the sequence (aiν) remains in the compact
subset A(E˜τ (e)). So the sequence (piν , (aiν) has a cluster point (p¯i, (a¯i)). From Lemma
3.2, (p¯i, (a¯i)) is also a pseudo-equilibrium of the truncated economy E˜τ . But p¯i1 = 0 since
τ∑
t=1
∑
`∈L
pνt` ≥
∑
`∈L
pνt¯` ≥ νL
converges to +∞ and 0 ≤ pν1` ≤ 1 for all ` ∈ L. Hence we get a contradiction since
Lemma 3.2 shows that for all t = 1, . . . , τ , p¯it 6= 0.

Appendix B
OLG with multiple goods: on the
existence result
Sketch of the proof of the existence of an equilibrium
We will proceed as in exchange economies (see Balasko et al. [4]) to establish the
existence of equilibrium in E .
Step 1: Truncate the economy at a finite horizon τ : we thus consider individuals born
up to period τ−1 and group them all together into Iτ−10 . The truncated economy with a
finite horizon Eτ =
(
Xτi, P τi, eτi
)
i∈Iτ−10 where, for each t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, for each i ∈ It,
Xτi = {x ∈∏τt=1RL+ | xt′ = 0, ∀t′ 6= t, t+ 1},
P τi(x) = P i(xi),
eτi = (eτit′ )
τ
t′=1 such that e
τi
t = e
i
t, e
τi
t+1 = e
i
t+1 and e
τi
t′ = 0 if t
′ 6= t, t + 1 satisfies
the sufficient conditions for the existence of pseudo-equilibrium in finite dimension of
Gale and Mas-Colell [31], [32], where the production set is Y = {0}. Indeed, the
Xτi’s are closed (as a sum of closed subsets of R2L+ ), convex, non-empty and bounded
below, the P τi(x)’s are open in X and convex, and the income functions ατi’s defined
by ατi(p) = p · eτi satisfy ατi(p) > inf p · Xτi = 0. The difference between a pseudo-
equilibrium and an equilibrium is that we do not require the market clearing condition
at the last period τ and we artificially increase the initial endowments by adding those
of the consumers of the generation τ . We also recall that if τ ′ > τ , then the restriction
of a pseudo-equilibrium of Eτ ′ to the τ − 1 first generations is a pseudo-equilibrium of
Eτ .
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Step 2: We prove that prices and allocations remain in a compact space of a suitable
linear space and we finally show that an equilibrium of the OLG economy is a limit
point of pseudo-equilibria for the esquence of truncated economies.
Relation between the aggregate normal cone and the normal cones to
the individual preferred sets 1
NP¯t((xi))(x¯
t) =
⋂
i∈It
NP¯ i(xi)(x
i)
Proof. Indeed, let q ∈ ∩i∈ItNP¯ i(xi)(xi), then q · (zi − xi) ≤ 0 for all zi ∈ P¯ i(xi),
i ∈ It. Thus by summing up, q ·
∑
i∈It(z
i − xi) = q · (∑i∈It zi −∑i∈It xi) ≤ 0, where∑
i∈It z
i ∈ P¯t((xi)). Consequently, ∩i∈ItNP¯ i(xi)(xi) ⊂ NP¯t((xi))(x¯t).
Conversely, let q ∈ NP¯t((xi))(x¯t), then for all z ∈ P¯t((xi)), q · (z − x¯t) ≤ 0. Since
Pt((x
i)) =
∑
i∈It P¯
i(xi), for all i ∈ It, there exists zi ∈ P¯ i(xi) such that z =
∑
i∈It z
i.
By linearity of the scalar product,
∑
i∈It q · (zi − xi) ≤ 0. By taking zi = xi for all
i 6= 1, i ∈ It = {1, 2, . . . It} and z1 ∈ P¯ 1(x1), then q · (z1 − x1) ≤ 0 which means
that q ∈ NP¯ i(x1)(x1). By repeating the same reasoning for i = 2, . . . It, we obtain that
q · (zi − xi) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ It, thus NP¯t((xi))(x¯t) ⊂ ∩i∈ItNP¯ i(xi)(xi). 
1This relation was also provided in [52] p. 230, as an exercice
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